I got this one sent through from a buddy of mine who bailed from KAL after 12 months. His crewing company wanted to know why he was leaving, so he told 'em. Pretty much sums it up....
Hi Xxxxxx,
The shrinking value of the USD, the attitude to the foreign pilots, the lack of adequate training and the poor attitude to flight safety are all reasons to leave KAL.
I have been told that the last time the foreign pilot reps approached the company about the non-competitive salary package, they were told it was not going to change and it was none of their business. The Korean crews would obviously be happy to see all of us go, but I fear for the flying public if that happens. When the foreign training advisor was asked to gather information on current issues concerning the foreign pilot group, he was made a pariah and accused of trying to form a union. The manager who asked him to gather the information denied ever making the request. The foreign manager resigned from his post as a result. A sad loss for Korean (although I doubt they looked at it that way), as the few foreigners who work in flight ops management really do try to make a difference.
The failure rate for the interview process is purely the result of the union pilots input at the simulator stage. The state of serviceability of the 777 simulator is a complete joke for a major airline. Candidates are sometimes asked to do irrelevant and ridiculous tasks and are failed for nonsense. From what I have seen of the skill level of the local KAL crews, few, if any of them would ever pass the interview and simulator. KAL needs more foreign pilots, not just to make up the numbers, but because the standard of many of the Korean crews is abysmal. If they are to continue on their current accident free run, more Korean pilots are not the answer. I realise you make your living employing pilots for KAL, but if I knew 18 months ago what I know now about KAL, I would not have applied. After a while I guess some people can become immune to what is going on around them, but I found it very frustrating.
I have kept records of some of the ridiculous incidents that have taken place during my tenure at KAL, and of the attitudes of the crews I have flown with, and their responses to those incidents. The average Korean pilots understanding of the aircraft he is flying and of the operation in general is very limited. You can teach a monkey to follow a procedure, but not to understand what he is trying to achieve. When something out of the ordinary happens, they are all at sea.
The poor standards are not entirely the Korean pilots fault. Korean managements attitude to safety is appalling. Hardly surprising when you consider they have a raffle every couple of years and change all the managers. People are not promoted to management because they have any talent or ability, let alone a desire to see things change for the better. They run the airline like a private club. There is no continuity or accountability at the flight operations management level. They send us emails about improving safety, but nobody ever replied or even acknowledged any emails I sent. The changes to CAT3 operations last year were a classic example. None of the line crews I flew with understood what they were doing. At a recurrent ground school a local LCP admitted he had no clue either, and when I explained the correct procedures to he and two local FO's told me that I did not understand the concept of all weather operations (I must have been wrong for the past 18 years). Recurrent tests and exams are always accompanied by a set of answers, so there is no attempt to improve knowledge or standards, just to make sure everyone passes and the operation continues. My radio licence test consisted of attending a classroom to watch the movie "Flightplan" (with Jodie Foster) and an 80's movie about a couple of guys ferrying Pawnees across the Pacific. Attendance was mandatory. Bored out of my skull, I slept through the second movie. My Radio Licence turned up a few weeks later.
I have attended two safety meetings, which local management are supposed to attend. On both occasions they were absent during the meetings and only turned up for the free buffet and drinks after the meeting. We received notices to flight crew that were only published in Korean. When I found mistakes in the Oral test for my annual check, the Korean version of the test was changed, but not the English version. On both of my final line checks I was exposed to incompetence and interference from my 'supporting' LCP's. Their knowledge of the aircraft is appalling and their idea of competence is to be able to quote procedures parrot fashion without understanding what they are doing, or even if it is appropriate to the situation. Everything is a competition and comes down to who is right, rather than what is right. My LIP (who had an extremely poor command of English) gave me bad grades because I followed SOP rather than follow his unsafe, non-standard, "time saving" techniques. When I queried this he threw my training folder at me and fed me a bull**** line about how the chief pilot told him he could do it the SOP way or his own way. He struggled on the radio on most of our training sectors and did not exhibit a single trait that would have made him an instructor in any other airline. Another expat pilot told me he had the same instructor when he joined and experienced similar problems.
Crews refuse to de-ice their aircraft because they consider it macho to take off with an ice covered aeroplane. I have had debates with Korean captains on more than one occasion about the state of the aircraft, and have been challenged by ground engineers for recommending to the operating captain that we remove the ice and snow that was evident on the aircraft. An auditor told me how de-icing staff were caught diluting de-icing fluid and selling the balance back to the fluid provider, and then signing the fluid off as 100%.
I have operated flights where, for 10 hours, the Korean first officer refuses to speak to me because he doesn't like foreigners. This is after I have introduced myself and done everything possible to be extremely polite and accommodating. I have spent almost 4 hours in the cockpit without any contact from the cabin. The cabin crew close all the window shades immediately after takeoff regardless of what time of day it is, so if the cockpit crew were asleep, dead or whatever and the aircraft was intercepted, nobody would know. Maybe another KAL 007 incident would change that. We are required to attend a briefing before every flight with the cabin crew, and if the operating captain is Korean, the whole thing is done in Korean. When I brief, the cabin crew understand little if any of what I say, (if their subsequent questions are any indication). CRM is non-existent and there is often a palpable animosity between flight and cabin crew.
We are forced to fly with all radios blaring, the loudspeaker turned up and a headset on, with cabin calls, PA's, radio chatter and ATC all mixed into one garbled barrage of sound. Apparently this is so we don't miss any ATC calls. Of course, it has the opposite effect, but it's a procedure, so it must be followed without regard for common sense. Crews ask me to be a safety pilot and then conduct all their briefings and conversation in Korean and ignore me when I point out threats to safety. I have seen crews attempt to descend through their cleared level and then argue with me that they are right, attempt to taxi across active runways when told to hold short, ignore ATC speed instructions, fight with each other over who is right, captains yelling at FO's...all the things that KAL supposedly don't do any more. Colleagues have seen worse than this. I won't act as safety pilot any more as my presence on the flight deck in the event of any incident will no doubt see the finger pointed at me for not preventing the situation.
Dispatchers have a poor command of English, so any problems arising from incorrect or nonsensical flight plans are difficult to resolve. They assume they are in command of the flight and come up with ridiculous responses to serious situations. Yet the Korean crews will follow the dispatchers guidance without question. A 747 with smoke in the cockpit was told to continue, as was a 777 mid-Pacific with a fuel leak. The 747 avoided disaster through pure chance. Luckily the 777 had an expat on board and diverted to Anchorage.
I don't think it's a matter of if KAL have another accident, but when. They simply don't want to change their poor safety culture because it may be painful and involve some short term loss of face for the older guys. Making English the required language for all flight operations staff (and enforcing the rule) would be a good start. Crews always fall back on the few manuals that are published in Korean, and ignore those that are only presented in English. Doing away with the Korean books would be difficult for a while but would ultimately improve operations, crew knowledge and understanding, and ultimately safety.
It could the best airline, and should be the best job in the world, but the Koreans don't seem to want that to happen.
Regards,
Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx