What needs to be done is to create a few more airship posts to control the lack of leadership that allows this nonsense to happen in the first place.
Don't know if that was tongue in cheek. The chief enforcer of the 1991 policy was Director General Support Management, an RAF AVM 2 Star. His immediate boss, who did nothing despite highly critical audits and reports, was the RAF Chief Engineer. Across in MoD(PE), their counterparts (Director General Air Systems 2 - 2 Star and Chief of Defence Procurement - 4 Star) adopted the same stance; one they maintained for many years and, in fact, officially remains extant. This has been upheld by five successive Mins(AF) and two PUSs although there are visible attempts to change.
In the example I quoted, to be fair to EFA they identified the risk and tried to do something. What speaks volumes is the failure to appreciate there were extant regulations - something their most junior project officer would have been expected to both know and have spent many years implementing. However, the risk identification was their permitted limit, as the above PE Stars had ruled that no risk mitigation should be undertaken. The very act of convening the meeting risked disciplinary action, although I seem to recall their 2 Star was more flexible about his staff breaking such rules. Ours, DGAS2, was not and sought regular reassurance his staffs were not implementing the regulations; with staffs being instructed not to attend risk meetings or notify risks.
As ever, the best type of person to sort this out is one who has nothing left to lose!