EMPEROR'S CLOTHING ...
... sometimes when there is an intrenched philosophy it is difficult for people who have been immersed in it to see the truth - people start whole 'religions' based on twisted ideas.
Reading the accident reports for twins it is clear that the utility of this profile is insignificant in comparison with the other risk factors (and may actually be counterproductive).
I am happy to start trying to collate them and will make a non exhaustive preliminary stab at it:
1 This profile exposes the helicoter to a high risk scenario for much greater time.
2 Uses the upper range of engine output for considerably longer.
3 Uses a higher relative power output than alternative.
4 The machine is vunerable to other failures, T/R malfunctions, crew coordination, collision.
5 Incresed exposure to control problems - having such a low energy state for such a long period makes the A/C vunerable to the random vagaries of the atmosphere with at least two major controls running near their limits (or potentially near their limits) (T/R and Collective).
6 The greatest mitigator for risk on takeoff is to have a deliberate 'extended hover phase' prior to T/O. During this period the probability of ANY catastrophic event drops rapidly with time.
7 The 'BIG IDEA' of twin engines is supposed to be that it 'doesn't matter' if one fails. If you fly a regime where you actually NEED two engines - then the risk is much higher since there is at least twice the chance that one of the two might let go.
8 Three or more hands required (throttle levers) for longer - reversing the benefits of two independant crew and making it two crew dependant.
9 Increased FOD risk - (look at the accidents)
Is it REALLY worth exposing the helicopter to these EXTRA risks for the return of it being THEORETICALLY possible to withstand an event of such unlikelyhood that as far as we can determine it has NEVER HAPPENED ?
Furthermore it is more amazing that this event does not occur more often since the very profile we are talking about ACTUALLY INCREASES (dramatically) the likelyhood of it occuring!
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Soggy : of course HAD your 'engine event' occured at the critical point in a translating type profile then yes you may well have hit your tail. - BUT clearly the fact of the matter (which you side stepped) is that in your case since the engine let go "just after rotation" you would have had sufficient energy production (especially applied in a more energy efficient manner) to have been at an aerodynamically efficient velocity - such that it would not have been a factor - FURTHERMORE to what extent was the power failure you experienced ATTRIBUTABLE to the profile you were flying?
THEREFORE your case is still NOT an example of that profile being of ant ACTUAL use - only THEORETICAL.
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There have been NO EXAMPLES of an engine failing during the climbing up and back.
I asked the most a highly experienced (>40,000 hrs) Rotary pilot (that I know of) weather he ever used this profile in the military twin he flew : He said "certainly not!" and went on to explain why it is the most absurd concept - he though it had been 'invented' by a British operator (MACS or Bristow) to keep their Flight Ops Inspector happy - and avalanched from there.
Yes the twin has a place in risk reduction - but it's not always safer.
To make any true improvements to safety one must be honest to the factors and figures in a scientific way.
The discussion should be in terms of TIME EXPOSED to RISK EVENT (TE) and PROBABILITY per TIME of EVENT (PTE) occuring and PROBABILITY of UNSECESSFUL OUTCOME to event (PUO).
With this profile both TE and PTE increase (and are multiplicative) PUO might (theoretically) be reduced. At the moment only PUO is looked at - this is a major flaw.
I don't really expect anyone to start actually re-evaluating this.
REMEMBER THE STORY OF THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHING ?