Today I noticed this story (from MSN news UK):
Warning over aircraft carrier risks
Ministers have failed to properly understand the risks entailed in their decision to leave Britain without an aircraft carrier for almost a decade, the Whitehall spending watchdog has warned.
The National Audit Office said changes to the carrier programme in the Government's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) had created "significant levels of operational, technical, cost and schedule uncertainty".
In a highly critical report, the NAO warned there were "major risks" surrounding its plans to reconstitute a carrier strike force from 2020 onwards.
Maybe this relates to skills being lost and then needed again? As to military chiefs wanting to axe CVF, I think we can say that the First Sea Lord did not, but the outgoing CDS was hostile, as was the then CGS who is now CDS (who got the
Prime Minister to to change the SDSR at the last minute), and CAS. Does anyone think any money saved would be spent on frigates and destroyers? To what end? Can they do what a carrier can?
The
Telegraph has a similar story:
The damaging effects of the Strategic Defence Review
The decision over the carriers was taken at a time when the MoD was already struggling to plug an estimated £35 billion hole in its budget, and in the face of strong opposition from the military (with the exception of the Royal Navy). It was also accompanied by the bizarre step of scrapping HMS Ark Royal and its fleet of Harrier jets – which means Britain will have to cope without an aircraft carrier until the Queen Elizabeth-class vessels are ready in a decade's time.
If maintaining our carrier capability was deemed to be so important for the future, why did the MoD feel it could take a "holiday" from having one available until 2020? To judge by France's successful deployment of its Charles de Gaulle carrier throughout the current Libya conflict, it would have been useful if British commanders had been in a position to deploy one too. It is just another example of the muddled thinking that has rendered the entire SDSR process a farce.
Since carrier related skills as such a key issue the Government needs to think about how to maintain those skills. Lease a dozen or so AV8Bs in exchange for our old Harriers - as suggested
here and
here, continue to embark US, Italian, or Spanish Harriers, or even consider the
RNR proposal again - possibly combined with one of the other options. The Future Reserves 2020 paper is due soon and there was talk of the Reserve forces maintaining capabilities not presently being used? If the First Sea Lord backed the idea then it shows how concerned Their Lordships are.
The following
quote from Widger on the thread dedicated to Sharkey Ward is worth reading:
Way off the mark there. I served at the CAOC in Italy during Deny Flight and can assure you that maritime platforms including the French were an integral part of the effort, with Sea Harriers not only flying CAP, but contributing to a significant amount of CAS and RECCE effort. As PART of the overall package, they were valuable especially during those times of the year when bases such as Aviano were fogged in and the only assets available were those in the Adriatic. Mostly conducted without the requirement for tanking as well.
I in no way devalue the contribution of land based air (who in the Balkans provided the overwhelming majority of assets) but as would be the case now off Libya, the provision of maritime air power would significantly enhance the overall effort and improve reaction times to specific events.
I note that at the forthcoming air day at
Yeovilton there will be a couple of static Sea Harriers and pair of T8 trainers, but the only flying naval fixed wing aircraft will be French ones....
