observation just above, Re' the landing-ARC at CLT 13Dec09 :
"... shoddy... slow investigation that the NTSB should be ashamed of ..."
The NTSB's main offense springs from their
attempt to formulate a "probable cause" statement: The Ops Group Report (52-pages, see docket) includes most of the omitted information. The writer of the
Ops Group Rpt provided a better quality document, and provided information that contradicted the NTSB's "final". That Ops Group Report was completed in March 2010 [
fifteen months prior to the NTSB's release of their "final" P.C.].
Advice: Pilots should
disregard the NTSB's final -- instead get the Ops Group Report, that clarifies most of the uncertainties of the Board's P.C. "final".
Advice for the Board: Lacking resources for careful consideration, you shouldn't even try to formulate a P.C. [Most of the time your official P.C. leads your reader off-course; with protecting the USA's airline, regulator, and manufacturer as NTSB's highest priority.] Another err in the NTSB's "full narrative" (web), was your
omission of any FDR analysis; there are lessons for pilots in the FDR-data after the human disconnected the Autoflight: Loc-dev goes from bad to worse with the human's "visual" over-control while in low-visibility near the runway (look at "bank angle" plot during last three seconds of flight). Docket offers only the "preliminary" time-history plots of selected data, docket contained NO FDR ANALYSIS. Each of three FDR-plots mistakes the MD80's "Air-Ground Sensor" (NLG strut compression) as instead "weight-on-wheels": the Abnormal Rwy Contact occurs about 4-seconds EARLIER than the time-line labeled "B" (right end of green shaded interval).
See "docket", Ops Gp Rpt
Operations - Specialist Report to the IIC
-- pg 26, Figure 7:
Right inboard
trailing edge flap damage.
-- pg 41, Figure 13
Left edge of 36C approach end;
tire ruts [photo of ruts in grass outboard of the concrete but INBOARD of the Rwy Edge Lights].
-- pg 42, Figure 14
Left main landing gear covered in dirt
Aside from the ARC [Abnormal Rwy Contact], the Ops Grp Rpt suggest this case as "USOS" taxonomy:
UNDERSHOOT/OVERSHOOT (USOS)
A touchdown off the runway surface.
Usage Notes:
• An undershoot/overshoot of the runway occurs in close proximity to the runway and also includes offside touchdowns and any occurrence where the landing gear touches off the runway surface.
• Off-airport ... excluded ...
• ... landing phase.
= = = = = = = = ==
"… During post incident interviews, both pilots stated that they selected flaps 40 as a final flap setting." ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 47]
"… chart depicts the bank angle limit versus the pitch limit (in degrees) …" ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 48.]
"… dispatcher also wrote 'CREW WAS CAT 3 ACFT [aircraft] WAS CAT 3 … and further wrote “RECAP: CAPT, ACFT AND AIRPORT WERE ALL CAT 3.' …" ["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 51.]
= == = == = = = = =
The NTSB's "final" P.C. repeatedly states that those mishap-pilots were flying a Cat-3 (low vis approach). However, the Captain's own write-up in the Mx Logbook contradicts that investigator-assertion:
"… logbook page showed the following December 13, 2009 second line entry (page 10532110) for flight 1402:
'On Cat III [Captain had striked-through the "III" then entered] II (2) Wingtip touch on landing ... [Captain’s Initials]'"
["docket", Ops Gp Rpt, page 25, Figure 5: image Captain' entry into the Mx Logbook].
Since the Rwy 36C-Loc did not provide rollout guidance (note #4 on approach plate), that
ILS-Loc was NOT authorized for AA's MD80 Cat-3 Autoland: On final at 300' the pilot disconnected the autopilot, and did a manual landing. All the NTSB's paragraphs discussing Cat-3 Approaches lead the reader off-course [since both Autoland and Cat-3 were prohibited and the pilot did neither].
In several respects this
ARC-,
USOS- mishap [
13Dec09 at CLT] is similar to the AA low-vis USOS- event at DEN/ 21Nov04
DEN05IA027