Originally Posted by
Safety Concerns
The Dekker report ignores these facts from the accident report.
Although we here have only just found the Dekker report, I believe it
predates the accident report, and therefore can be excused from not knowing its conclusions. In fact, I think parts of the Dekker report are actually
in the accident report (haven't verified, but got definite "I've read that bit before" feeling).
Another point where Dekker differs from the final report, is that he states (as a finding) that the aircraft was irrecoverable at stick shaker, (there is little attention paid to the recovery effort, possibly as consequence of this assumption). Dekker also points to the Bournemouth 737 incident, and seems to be saying that a 737 at stick shaker, with pitch-up trim, is so difficult to recover that the crash is pretty much certain.
In contrast, the final report states that the a/c
was recoverable at stick shaker, and recommends approach-to-stall procedure and training changes.
Also, there seems to be a, possibly very significant, factual discrepancy between the reports as regards timelines, which may lead to the differing conclusions above:
Dekker has this:
09:25:47.5 stick shaker onset
09:25:48 Power applied to throttles. Throttles halfway up, then back to idle.
09:25:49
09:25:50 Captain: “I have.” Safety pilot: “Speed.”
09:25:51 A/T OFF
09:25:52 Full power applied Safety pilot: “100 knots.”
While final report has (my emphasis):
Once the captain had taken over control, the autothrottle
was disconnected, but no thrust was selected at that point. Nine seconds after the commencement
of the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward
Which look quite different to me - anyone got any better insight ?