I thought the HF report was very well written and covered many points, sometimes looking from different/unusual directions. The section on FMA use (or not!) was interesting and warrants much greater exposure.
What I don't really accept, in common with other posters, is that there was much degree of stability in the the approach. To me, it was a classic rush job: turned in early, too high and fast, went through 1,000' in IMC a) with idle thrust, b) not fully configured, c) way above Vref and d) landing checks not even started.
Quoting from the report: "There is, of course, no generic set of criteria that would make an approach “rushed.”" - I'm afraid I'm going to disagree there, too - most reputable airlines plus ICAO, EASA et. al. use 1,000'R, some allow 500R in VMC (not applicable here). The fact that they were so distracted by executing the landing checklist below 1,000' that basic monitoring was lost, speaks volumes.
There was a long discussion of the technical aspects of why the autothrottle behaved as it did but is that really relevant? At the end of the day, the crew were faced with a failure of the A/T system, i.e. it didn't advance the thrust levers when required. At that instant it is simply "a failure": if at that moment any other sort of technical problem had rendered the A/T U/S, the end result would have been the same...
Overall, though, I found it a very good read with some excellent background material and liked the author's style.