An interesting report...
However, I disagree with the basics of attributing
solely the accident to the automatics failing. Have we really got to the stage where an ATHR fault, on final app, can cause the airspeed to fatally decay, and absolve the crew?
Our (Airbus) FCOM is clear that the crew must monitor the ATHR performance, and disconnect it if it fails to maintain the selected speed.
There is no persuasive basis in the record to conclude that the approach was “rushed.”
It depends on the definition of a "rushed approach". In our company, a "rushed approach" is one where the 500' stabilised approach criteria are not met. In this case they were not - approach power was not set and the speed not correct. Depending on company SOP, had the crew checked the parameters at 1000'/500' against their requirements, the error would have been apparent.
NB in some SOPs the "NHP" is actually "PM". In this case, there was a 3rd pilot specifically to make up for a potential shortfall in "monitoring".
As ever, lessons for all to take on board. But I stand by my assertion that a failure of an AP or ATHR system does not absolve the crew
NoD