I accept the points made above that the RFM is mostly actually used by the team producing OMs and checklists. I do think may basic point is still valid as Sikorsky's changes influence those management/trainers and their changes then affect crews.
Having said that, it is not uncommon for operators in North America flying large aircraft to actually have their crews use uncontrolled checklists produced by the simulator training companies! I bet that would shock the North Sea jocks.
When I read:
you have an industry almost totally devoid of managerial training and consequently constantly populated by more ex-CPs that current CPs
I did think for a second I was reading the work of Shell Management! But on reflection it does highlight one weakness of many operators when it comes to the continuity of effective flight operations management.
I have recently been pointed (via a series of PMs) at some past comments by Nick Lappos after one of the Shell Brunei incidents (here on 27 Jan 2008
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/163...ml#post3867445) - I have made some text bold:
I wrote the S76 checklist, and in the intro paragraph to Chapter 3 gave the pilot the latitude to be more than a sweaty flight-manual reader. The difference between airmanship/wisdom and memorizing flight manuals is the difference between pilots and stick wigglers, IMHO. If the flight manual words say "XXX" and you think you must do it, then do so. However, if the PIC decides to actually try some airmanship, in many cases it would be welcomed.
The ease of saying and preaching (in the ease of a Sunday at the keyboard criticizing your fellow pilot) blind obedience to the flight manual, "land immediately" is often confounded by the actual conditions, and by the fact that the aircraft is still flying nicely, even if a few lights are on. I am reminded of the American Airlines DC10 Chicago engine drop-off accident: In simulator trials afterward, the crews that obeyed the checklist and slowed to Vy (while they were climbing at over 2000 fpm before the slow-down) all died like dogs, those that flew wisely like airmen landed successfully.
I do not know what happened with this specific aircraft, at all, but I am lead to believe from 212man's posts that it did not lose all or most of its oil, rather, it might be that it had an oil leak. Any pilot who ditches a load of passengers with an oil leak (even if he memorized the flight manual in that case) might deserve to be ppruned to death, afterwards.
I note in the last para that "lose all or most oil" is treated differently to an "oil leak". I assume in the latter case a 'ppruning' is not considered to be deserved...
I also see that other people failed to appreciate the subtly of the S-92A RFM, like Variable Load (same page
http://www.pprune.org/3868816-post974.html) as they defended the S-92A and compared it to its competitors:
I can tell you that the S92 FM does not say to Land Immediately with low MGB oil pressure, the Land Immediately comes into play when secondary indications of impending gearbox failure are present, such as unusual noises, smoke in cabin, etc.
Nothing about continuing pressure drop there.
The Wells Report is due out this week:
N.L. inquiry to release report on fatal offshore helicopter crash
Cougar and Sikorsky are in court next week.