Originally Posted by Mad Flt Scientist
That may be true. But airliner annunciations are not, in general, designed for test flights; they are designed for normal operations, and to minimize workload by masking messages which are not expected to be critical - so called "nuisance" or "status" messages. In this case the system thought it was rejecting the one bad value and still had dual redundancy - plenty of margin of safety for a flight where stall approach is an unlikely event. But in this case such a manoeuvre was probability=1. Which throws all the usual risk calculations out the window.
Any flight has the potential to flirt with the limits, without being called a test flight. Isn’t it one main reason how Airbus justified the protections ?
Full back stick is the Airbus procedure for GPWS warning … How would you justify the system did not deem as necessary to advise the pilot it was not the best idea on that day to blind fully trust its system ?