squib66
In PHI / Shell S-76C++ case Sikorsky were quick to point out that the standard windscreen was certified to the higher BCAR requirements.
It is. It’s a shame your post does not note that some operators chose to remove the BCAR approved glass laminated windshield installed by the manufacture of the platform and author of the RFM and install a lightweight cast acrylic screen which in order to obtain similar impact tolerances, could only be achieved at speeds below 109 knots.
FH1100 Pilot
Regardless of the particulars of the Cougar crash, Sikorsky is going to have a hard time justifying to a jury how their transmission actually meets the requirements of 29.297(c)(1). Some (like me) would say that it does not. But who knows? The court (or NTSB, or whomever) may find that Sikorsky's assumptions about the trans were perfectly logical and reasonable. That would shut me up right quick.
Sikorsky did not certify the S-92 transmission to JAA 29.297(c)(1), that’s the job of the FAA/JAA, so go have the jury ask them.
But the Cougar pilots didn't have full information. All they had was a zero pressure reading, and the knowledge that other S-92's had suffered some kinds of oil pump failures. As we all know and admit, the zero pressure reading should have been enough for them to decide to put 'er down. But they did not. Being humans and not robots, the two of them came to a decision and made a mistake. We can be sure they knew what the RFM called for. We cannot be sure exactly why they disregarded it.
Now I’m not privy to the FDR/CVR evidence and I’m sure all will be revealed pretty soon, but even in basic training, signs of a loss of oil would be a corresponding increase in oil temperature, would it not?