I started this thread years ago, under a different Government - when the 1998 SDR was still the plan - minus the Sea Harrier, a Tornado F3 unit, the frigate/destroyer number falling below the 32 figure that was set out in the 1998 paper, and a few other things.
From reading the comments left on the websites of the major newspapers, it seems clear that people have almost no understanding of what HM Forces, particularly the RN and RAF, actually do. It would appear that many seem convinced that future conflicts will be a carbon copy of the current one in Afghanistan - that is against an enemy with no air force or navy, no armour and no big guns. This is the line taken by many in the media too.
Why is this? Is it because it easy to assume that the future will be more of the same? Is it more sensible to concentrate on current threats rather than emerging or future ones? Perhaps we do not know future threats - but we do know future vulnerabilities. Should we think more about these?
As an example - take the comments by Melchett01
here:
Now whilst there isn't much of an air threat in Afghanistan, that is not to say that at some point in the future that threat won't emerge. Either directly against the UK, or against UK forces deployed on operations. Just looking around the globe at many of the states that we would consider to be less than friendly will show that they have air forces made up largely of Russian kit -Fulcrums, Flankers and the like - precisely the sort of Soviet threat that is perceived as being irrelevant. So fast forward 30 years and we have cobbled together some sort of expeditionary capability to go and be a force for good somewhere.
We don't have much of an AD capability, because 30 years earlier argued it was irrelevant and we really needed Reapers and armoured vehicles, so that's where the money went. So as the helos land on the beach or the ramp comes down on the landing craft, all we will be able to do is watch as you are harassed on the beaches and HLZs by the Frogfoots or have your Chinooks shot down by a long range shot from a Flanker variant operating BVR ops. Later on you receive intelligence to suggest an HVT is going to be at a certain location at a certain time, but you can't do anything about it as you are essentially a slow moving ground based force with limited long range strike options. Equally, your troops become involved in a TiC; now most of your AH has been lost in the opening salvos, leaving you with a few armed Reapers and a couple of lightly armed Tucanos. Not a problem, other than they are operating at the otherside of the AO today, and by the time they get to your TiC it is all over. Wouldn't something fast and pointy with a long range strike option or the ability to provide rapid support multiple target sets thanks to a heavy swing role payload be a useful thing to have? Certainly not something you will get with a Super Tucano. Of course, it will probably be the RAF's fault that we couldn't secure the airspace to provide an umbrella for ground and ISTAR operations, and that ground forces are being picked off bit by bit by an enemy that over the years has understood the benefit of a decent air capability.
All very hypothetical I admit, but do you want to take the risk? Fifteen years ago, we were just coming out of the Cold War and talking about a revolution in military affairs where asymmetric, cyber warfare was the future. That theory must have lasted all of a few years before we went back to a primitive but effective enemy that wouldn't be out place in the Flintstones. The moral of the story, is for the Army to look over the parapet of its ivory towers and realise that they are not the only show in town, and without the broad spectrum of capabilities provided by its sister Services, it really won't take much for the foundations of that ivory tower to become rather unstable.