Dannatt and Page
JFZ90
Agreed.
When they were talking to Band and Page I thought the next obvious step was to mention the BAeS, sorry, Defence Industrial and Technology Strategies.
But there again, it would be just too embarrassing to admit that the DTS was, for example, mooting the development of various "future" technolgical solutions, when better solutions were already in service!
When this was pointed out on one example (in a FoI exchange) the MoD scientist charged with replying declined to pursue the matter and the following year (2009) an aircraft IPT at Wyton issued an Invitation to Tender to develop an RAF requirement that has been in service with the RN since 1997 and upgraded in 2000. The IPT actually formally chastised one bidder's MD when one of his staff told them they didn't need the R&D, the total procurement could be met for under £500k inside 3 months. I understand the 2 year R&D contract was let, valued at around £5M (according to the Contracts Bulletin). I spoke to the original designer and supplier and all they had to do for their money was dig out a 13 year old spec (owned, by the way, by MoD!). But they can't make the kit to that spec as the obsolete tooling has been destroyed.
In another example, a £3M contract was let by one IPT at ABW to develop, over 3 years, a solution that was already in service and being bought on a rolling basis, in huge quantities, by an Andover IPT. As the technology was already in service with just about every Army in the world, and half the households to boot, you'd think...... Again, a bidder was crucified for pointing out the R&D was unnecessary, as they could sell a better solution for £43 a pop, whereas the existing contracts (!) were paying over £400. (x 10,000 or so a year is a lot of money).
A few clues in there as to how to save a few Billion - each year - while actually enhancing Operational Effectiveness. Instead, here comes SDSR which will degrade OE. As I said, the suggestions were rejected by MoD.
Agreed.
When they were talking to Band and Page I thought the next obvious step was to mention the BAeS, sorry, Defence Industrial and Technology Strategies.
But there again, it would be just too embarrassing to admit that the DTS was, for example, mooting the development of various "future" technolgical solutions, when better solutions were already in service!
When this was pointed out on one example (in a FoI exchange) the MoD scientist charged with replying declined to pursue the matter and the following year (2009) an aircraft IPT at Wyton issued an Invitation to Tender to develop an RAF requirement that has been in service with the RN since 1997 and upgraded in 2000. The IPT actually formally chastised one bidder's MD when one of his staff told them they didn't need the R&D, the total procurement could be met for under £500k inside 3 months. I understand the 2 year R&D contract was let, valued at around £5M (according to the Contracts Bulletin). I spoke to the original designer and supplier and all they had to do for their money was dig out a 13 year old spec (owned, by the way, by MoD!). But they can't make the kit to that spec as the obsolete tooling has been destroyed.
In another example, a £3M contract was let by one IPT at ABW to develop, over 3 years, a solution that was already in service and being bought on a rolling basis, in huge quantities, by an Andover IPT. As the technology was already in service with just about every Army in the world, and half the households to boot, you'd think...... Again, a bidder was crucified for pointing out the R&D was unnecessary, as they could sell a better solution for £43 a pop, whereas the existing contracts (!) were paying over £400. (x 10,000 or so a year is a lot of money).
A few clues in there as to how to save a few Billion - each year - while actually enhancing Operational Effectiveness. Instead, here comes SDSR which will degrade OE. As I said, the suggestions were rejected by MoD.
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Just watched it and thought there were some broad key points which should have been discussed more fully, i.e.:
- The defence budget is not there to provide UK jobs.
- Too many people in desk support roles, and many not suitably qualified or remaining in post long enough.
- The defence budget is large; the problem is it is just squandered.
- The procurement process is incestuous and doesn't provide VFM.
However very poor examples were used in most cases which meant that the key points were lost with sensationalised, tabloid facts.
- We should have Blackhawks because of a unique minefield incident. If the Chinook had been allowed to use its winch? A medium lift helo requirement needs broader justification, even if we agree.
- MRA4 in service would have prevented a crash, untrue as it was an issue with how we ran airworthiness.
- Buy the same kit the SF use for every one. Much of it is not suited to general use, in fact much is deliberately brought for niche roles.
- We should have F-16s in the mid 90's not Typhoon, no comparison. Now if he had said F-15s, but he didn't!
- BAE had the highest cost overruns and all those over £1 billion. He then points out that they handle the largest projects, so it is obvious these will incur the highest overruns.
- Wildcat is too small for the Army. It's not too small for what they say they want it for, again back to the medium lift justification.
- Tried the us and them tactic by pointing out how much senior officers wasted on houses etc. The figures were very small in relation to the issues, and reallocating one Sgt from the Generals house to the front line won't help.
- Waste on school fees because HM Forces move often. He didn't offer an alternative so our kids should move schools possibly every 2 or 3 years?
- And there were more.
Do we think if we brought "off the peg" we would get more of what we want? No we would just get a smaller budget, still be short of kit and get the very cheapest answer. The politicians have to take much of the blame and I trust none of them, they always want to cut out a little more. Anyone in the military knows a piece of kit they would like to use, but will never get as it will be deemed over spec. we are only allowed to buy kit to do the specified task with no flexibility to cover contingencies, hence the mass of UORs. I'm all for buying off the peg if it allows us to get more out of what we buy; VFM shouldn't just be the cheapest.
No doubt I have probably “Paged” this by quoting half truths and rumour!
- The defence budget is not there to provide UK jobs.
- Too many people in desk support roles, and many not suitably qualified or remaining in post long enough.
- The defence budget is large; the problem is it is just squandered.
- The procurement process is incestuous and doesn't provide VFM.
However very poor examples were used in most cases which meant that the key points were lost with sensationalised, tabloid facts.
- We should have Blackhawks because of a unique minefield incident. If the Chinook had been allowed to use its winch? A medium lift helo requirement needs broader justification, even if we agree.
- MRA4 in service would have prevented a crash, untrue as it was an issue with how we ran airworthiness.
- Buy the same kit the SF use for every one. Much of it is not suited to general use, in fact much is deliberately brought for niche roles.
- We should have F-16s in the mid 90's not Typhoon, no comparison. Now if he had said F-15s, but he didn't!
- BAE had the highest cost overruns and all those over £1 billion. He then points out that they handle the largest projects, so it is obvious these will incur the highest overruns.
- Wildcat is too small for the Army. It's not too small for what they say they want it for, again back to the medium lift justification.
- Tried the us and them tactic by pointing out how much senior officers wasted on houses etc. The figures were very small in relation to the issues, and reallocating one Sgt from the Generals house to the front line won't help.
- Waste on school fees because HM Forces move often. He didn't offer an alternative so our kids should move schools possibly every 2 or 3 years?
- And there were more.
Do we think if we brought "off the peg" we would get more of what we want? No we would just get a smaller budget, still be short of kit and get the very cheapest answer. The politicians have to take much of the blame and I trust none of them, they always want to cut out a little more. Anyone in the military knows a piece of kit they would like to use, but will never get as it will be deemed over spec. we are only allowed to buy kit to do the specified task with no flexibility to cover contingencies, hence the mass of UORs. I'm all for buying off the peg if it allows us to get more out of what we buy; VFM shouldn't just be the cheapest.
No doubt I have probably “Paged” this by quoting half truths and rumour!
I think the Commercial off the Self / Off the Peg argument is too simplistic. What people actually mean when they say this is often Military off the Shelf (e.g. Blackhawk).
MoD do give thought to these things so I’ll summarise the formal advice on COTS (not MOTS) to the Secy of State (whom I’m quite sure hasn’t read it!).
Pros
· Cheap
· Readily available
· Small and Light
· The Potential for standard commercial interfaces
Cons
· Designed for a benign environment – seldom not below zero
· Capability may not match requirement
· Rapid Obsolescence – they are designed for a short life so of little consequence to normal user
· Not easily repairable – very often sealed units which are deemed disposable
· Changing specification very expensive
· Poor support – problems are usually addressed in the next generation, not by modification
In the RAF there is one long standing classic example of COTS use. I’m not allowed to discuss it here, but we have 3 of the aircraft and they are about to be replaced. We have a Spec Role Bay (or had) to “tweak” any of the boxes but by and large they are recognisable as the COTS devices and supported as such with very efficient contracts with suppliers which are not too different from the “collect at home” contracts you buy with your new PC. (For example, Hewlett Packard have an excellent scheme). This works a treat, but the average life of a system (often a dozen or so different boxes per system, and over 30 different systems per aircraft) is only expected to be 18 months or so; so there is funding available at any given time for total replacement, as opposed to repair. And replacement lead times are in days, not years. Some kit lasts longer as the requirement seldom changes, and you find this is the kit that is not COTS, but designed to a more robust Mil Spec. Overall, I’d say the cost is much the same as if it were Mil Spec, 20 year life kit. It is not the money that is the sole driver, but the operational flexibility and constantly optimised OE is given equal weight (which is how it should be, IMO).
So, there are indeed many applications for COTS, but the entire Procurement and Logistic Support philosophy would have to change, from an expected 20 year support plan to sealed, disposable units/systems that are completely replaced every couple of years. And, of course, you’d need to retain the existing infrastructure and policies for kit that can’t be COTS. We would need lots of “Special Role Bays” and expertise to integrate individuals COTS boxes into working systems – this expertise has been offloaded over the last 20 years, and with the demise of MoD 3rd Line workshops there is no longer an in-house recruitment ground. I’d say this does happen in isolated areas of MoD, but often a result not of policy, but individual initiative. One could argue what route a project takes in this respect is the mandated role of DEC when he develops the Requirement and the ILSM when he develops the proposed Maintenance Policy, before the contract is even let or funding firmed up. How many even consider this? Very few, because the rules are against you. Any such original thought hits the brick wall of red tape and the time wasted negates any COTS efficiency. He could spend his 2 year tour trying to get a COTS approval, and been seen as a failure at the end of it for trying to d a good job. In practice, the decision is left with procurers, who are castigated if they deviate from spec or mess with the funding profile (which is completely screwed up if you go COTS). In summary – it’s up to DEC to push for change if they want it.
MoD do give thought to these things so I’ll summarise the formal advice on COTS (not MOTS) to the Secy of State (whom I’m quite sure hasn’t read it!).
Pros
· Cheap
· Readily available
· Small and Light
· The Potential for standard commercial interfaces
Cons
· Designed for a benign environment – seldom not below zero
· Capability may not match requirement
· Rapid Obsolescence – they are designed for a short life so of little consequence to normal user
· Not easily repairable – very often sealed units which are deemed disposable
· Changing specification very expensive
· Poor support – problems are usually addressed in the next generation, not by modification
In the RAF there is one long standing classic example of COTS use. I’m not allowed to discuss it here, but we have 3 of the aircraft and they are about to be replaced. We have a Spec Role Bay (or had) to “tweak” any of the boxes but by and large they are recognisable as the COTS devices and supported as such with very efficient contracts with suppliers which are not too different from the “collect at home” contracts you buy with your new PC. (For example, Hewlett Packard have an excellent scheme). This works a treat, but the average life of a system (often a dozen or so different boxes per system, and over 30 different systems per aircraft) is only expected to be 18 months or so; so there is funding available at any given time for total replacement, as opposed to repair. And replacement lead times are in days, not years. Some kit lasts longer as the requirement seldom changes, and you find this is the kit that is not COTS, but designed to a more robust Mil Spec. Overall, I’d say the cost is much the same as if it were Mil Spec, 20 year life kit. It is not the money that is the sole driver, but the operational flexibility and constantly optimised OE is given equal weight (which is how it should be, IMO).
So, there are indeed many applications for COTS, but the entire Procurement and Logistic Support philosophy would have to change, from an expected 20 year support plan to sealed, disposable units/systems that are completely replaced every couple of years. And, of course, you’d need to retain the existing infrastructure and policies for kit that can’t be COTS. We would need lots of “Special Role Bays” and expertise to integrate individuals COTS boxes into working systems – this expertise has been offloaded over the last 20 years, and with the demise of MoD 3rd Line workshops there is no longer an in-house recruitment ground. I’d say this does happen in isolated areas of MoD, but often a result not of policy, but individual initiative. One could argue what route a project takes in this respect is the mandated role of DEC when he develops the Requirement and the ILSM when he develops the proposed Maintenance Policy, before the contract is even let or funding firmed up. How many even consider this? Very few, because the rules are against you. Any such original thought hits the brick wall of red tape and the time wasted negates any COTS efficiency. He could spend his 2 year tour trying to get a COTS approval, and been seen as a failure at the end of it for trying to d a good job. In practice, the decision is left with procurers, who are castigated if they deviate from spec or mess with the funding profile (which is completely screwed up if you go COTS). In summary – it’s up to DEC to push for change if they want it.
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Well, I guess that answers my Lewis Page question then... 
Tuc, have you ever thought of writing a book yourself - cataloging the kind of horror stories that you've seen over the years that would be enough to drive anyone to the demon drink?
Probably be enough for Lewis Page to look like Enid Blyton by comparison....
Tuc, have you ever thought of writing a book yourself - cataloging the kind of horror stories that you've seen over the years that would be enough to drive anyone to the demon drink?
Probably be enough for Lewis Page to look like Enid Blyton by comparison....
I follow your logic Tuc, and...
...its pretty easy to work out what you're referring to, but I think you'd have to agree its a rather atypical case. You're not advocating that model could be applied to all platforms over the long term? Don't give the Lewis Page types false hope!
...In the RAF there is one long standing classic example of COTS use. I’m not allowed to discuss it here....
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Question for TOFO
"I'll see your MRA4 project and raise you the Scottish Parliment. (MRA4, 4 X over budget, Scottish Parliment Building, 10 X over budget)".
Not disputing the cost of the Scottish Parliament Building but intrigued to know where you get your MRA4 figures from?
Original budget was circa £2.7Bn, increased to £3.1Bn a few years back and has stayed the same since. That seems like a £400Mil/£2.7Bn sort of sum which appears to be approximately a 19% increase on the original budget.
Not disputing the cost of the Scottish Parliament Building but intrigued to know where you get your MRA4 figures from?
Original budget was circa £2.7Bn, increased to £3.1Bn a few years back and has stayed the same since. That seems like a £400Mil/£2.7Bn sort of sum which appears to be approximately a 19% increase on the original budget.
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Original budget was circa £2.7Bn, increased to £3.1Bn a few years back and has stayed the same since. That seems like a £400Mil/£2.7Bn sort of sum which appears to be approximately a 19% increase on the original budget.
Figures I am working on are:
2.1 Billion for 21 aircraft when the contract was awarded in 1996.
3.8 billion for 12 (or is 9?) aircraft today
Originally 100 million each
Now circa 400 million each
= 4 X increase.
I freely admit this is back of the fag packet stuff, especially as I'm no longer sure if we are getting 9 or 12 aircraft. However, my figure tallies with that which is frequently being quoted as the increase in cost (X 4.80) so I don't think it is a million miles out.
19 percent on the other hand...in your dreams!
JFZ90
No, not advocating that at all. The operators and maintainers loved it, but it was hassle to manage because of the red tape I mentioned and the attitudes of those few who were hostile to what you were trying to achieve - High Wycombe financiers especially. My point is that COTS is not the single solution some would have you think. My main concern is the tendency to buy COTS without thinking of systems integration, which is seldom understood; not helped by a long standing ruling that you can completely ignore it if it reduces cost or time. This ruling wasn't rescinded even when various Boards of Inquiry cited failure to integrate safety related systems as causal factors.
No, not advocating that at all. The operators and maintainers loved it, but it was hassle to manage because of the red tape I mentioned and the attitudes of those few who were hostile to what you were trying to achieve - High Wycombe financiers especially. My point is that COTS is not the single solution some would have you think. My main concern is the tendency to buy COTS without thinking of systems integration, which is seldom understood; not helped by a long standing ruling that you can completely ignore it if it reduces cost or time. This ruling wasn't rescinded even when various Boards of Inquiry cited failure to integrate safety related systems as causal factors.
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TOFO
I don't dispute that the unit cost has risen and indeed it may well be a budget of nearer £3.8Bn (not a figure I recognise but then what do I know) but unit cost and budget are 2 different things. To state that the aircraft are 4 x over budget is disingenuous at best. Pedantic I know but in these headline grabbing, sound-bite days, accuracy is important and the simple fact is that the MRA4 "budget" has not suddenly expanded to £12Bn (wish that it had!!!). More than happy to accept that unit cost has apparently increased. If that is what you meant then fine.
As an aside, knowing what I know now rather than 10 years ago when I fisrt joined the project, there was no way the RAF was going to get 21 MRA4's. See Tuc's many lucid and clear posts on why that was always a pipe-dream.
I will say that having flown the beast, the aircraft is already an impressive bit of kit and has huge potential (and I mean huge); it is, as always, up to the politicians to decide if we get to develop and exploit that potential, I'm just a driver airframes.
As an aside, knowing what I know now rather than 10 years ago when I fisrt joined the project, there was no way the RAF was going to get 21 MRA4's. See Tuc's many lucid and clear posts on why that was always a pipe-dream.
I will say that having flown the beast, the aircraft is already an impressive bit of kit and has huge potential (and I mean huge); it is, as always, up to the politicians to decide if we get to develop and exploit that potential, I'm just a driver airframes.
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Unit cost/total budget...that's all a bit too smoke and mirrors for me.
However, since I want to see the beast in service ASAP, perhaps best not to dwell on the cost overun anymore.
MRA4 aside, it would be nice for the taxpayers point of view to see the MOD and its contractors held to account for whatever the multitude of reasons that budgets spiral out of control. Likewise for public sector projects outwith the military sphere.
For those that would simply accept that big public sector projects will always be subject to these manifestly flawed procurement processes, remember this...
The ultimate price will be paid in people's jobs, as we shall see in the coming months.
However, since I want to see the beast in service ASAP, perhaps best not to dwell on the cost overun anymore.
MRA4 aside, it would be nice for the taxpayers point of view to see the MOD and its contractors held to account for whatever the multitude of reasons that budgets spiral out of control. Likewise for public sector projects outwith the military sphere.
For those that would simply accept that big public sector projects will always be subject to these manifestly flawed procurement processes, remember this...
The ultimate price will be paid in people's jobs, as we shall see in the coming months.
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To state that the aircraft are 4 x over budget is disingenuous at best. Pedantic I know but in these headline grabbing, sound-bite days, accuracy is important and the simple fact is that the MRA4 "budget" has not suddenly expanded to £12Bn (wish that it had!!!). More than happy to accept that unit cost has apparently increased. If that is what you meant then fine.
Will it see service? I absolutely hope so.
If it does get in, will it be great? Yes, the operators will make it so.
Could we have got something equally good, quicker and cheaper? Without doubt.
Will we learn a single thing from this (one of many) procurement cluster ****? Who knows? We appear to have learnt b*****r all from the last few hundred years all the way back to the locked up ammo boxes at Isandlwana.
QED
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The smoke and mirrors are still there.
The non recurring element (NRE) for design development etc will remain the same regardless of build numbers For the sake of argument, if the NRE was 1 million and your recurring cost (production build) for 10 items was another million, your unit cost for the programme is £200k. If you half the build, the NRE does not go away and your unit cost is £300k. This of course ignores any economy of scale for bulk buying of material.
The non recurring element (NRE) for design development etc will remain the same regardless of build numbers For the sake of argument, if the NRE was 1 million and your recurring cost (production build) for 10 items was another million, your unit cost for the programme is £200k. If you half the build, the NRE does not go away and your unit cost is £300k. This of course ignores any economy of scale for bulk buying of material.
TOFO,
We stopped having "lessons learnt" quite a few years ago. Now we only have "lessons identified".
It seems to me, with my schoolboy O-level (A grade though) English Language skills, that this means we are quite at liberty to repeat the same mistakes time after time, with no responsibilty, or accountability, to "learn" from previous events!
This is not simply a pedantic point, but rather a shift of mindset by the powers that be, and a classic avoidance of responsibility, culpability and accountability by those in the higher echlons..
We stopped having "lessons learnt" quite a few years ago. Now we only have "lessons identified".
It seems to me, with my schoolboy O-level (A grade though) English Language skills, that this means we are quite at liberty to repeat the same mistakes time after time, with no responsibilty, or accountability, to "learn" from previous events!
This is not simply a pedantic point, but rather a shift of mindset by the powers that be, and a classic avoidance of responsibility, culpability and accountability by those in the higher echlons..
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Smart procurement in action...
It's certainly worth a watch:
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od/player/3129790
Whilst Typhoon may be great at turning on a six pence and is no doubt a fantastic airplane, this is fairly irrelevant in modern aircombat (if it were ever to happen). I'm no jet bloke however surely:
· CAS capability = pod + bomb/gun.
· Air combat = radar and missile capability (with the performance required to get there to deliver said weapon).
One does wonder what the point is exactly.... Particularly liked the Farnborough shots with Typhoon wazzing around laden with bombs when it is very unlikely to be capable of deploying to AFG in the CAS role. Indeed, the most desired CAS platform in theatre - AC130. 5 please.
A grossly expensive and very late mess.
Thought it was also v interesting that he picked up on Wildcat. I do hope that the reason the AAC has not stuck itself with Wildcat is that it wasn't willing to take on the aircraft size/weight debate with the RAF over Blackhawk. Wildcat looks like a very effective Battlefield Recce Heli (BRH) platform. Great. But even in the unlikely event we were pitched into a conventional fight why on earth would we even need BRH when you've got Apache with a tank spotting radar.
What this SDSR sounds like it will lack is asking what you want from your heli fleet and then procuring it. One might even call such thinking a 'Strategic Review'. Col Tootal summed it up well I thought: heavy, medium and fires. So:
· Heavy: CH47. No debate there. Great trooping and CASEVAC aircraft flown well by RAF crews and bought off the shelf from Boeing.
· Fires: Apache - fires. No issues and maybe with joint crewing (as its already going). Bought off the shelf, and given to Westlands to charge a fortune to put new engines in and change the name on the manual.
· Medium: 'Blackhawk' (sized anyway). Everything else including ISTAR and limited fires. Ever seen a Blackhawk DAP! Crikey.... Could do either, buy off the shelf (hurrah), or Westlands could change the name on the manual (again) and charge £1m for each person who works there.
Does make you wonder where Merlin fits in. A huge, expensive aircraft that is only just more than ‘Medium’ capable but with no fires / ISTAR capability.
So, Wildcat. Err... Movement of 4 blokes. There's no decent weapons fitted to make it an effective fires platform (beyond crew served) and the EO is only suited for low level forward observation. So, even if it did arrive in time for AFG, you’ve got it, first UOR - an ISTAR camera.
Maybe Wildcat will get binned on Tue (along with Puma), leaving the door open for a switch to a medium heli. Would probably see this as either mixed or separate Army/RAF Sqns. Why not, it's worked in other areas... The Yanks have also very successfully fitted them with Mx cameras and weapons. Yet if that’s the game the AAC are playing I’d very surprised/impressed! Ultimately I care far less about who flies our aircraft than getting the best myriad of capabilities to support ground troops and deliver fires. If that means the AAC becomes an AH only fleet with RAF getting Blackhawk so be it. Although I would still argue (strongly) that the Army should be flying it.
Anyway, smart procurement in action...
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od/player/3129790
Whilst Typhoon may be great at turning on a six pence and is no doubt a fantastic airplane, this is fairly irrelevant in modern aircombat (if it were ever to happen). I'm no jet bloke however surely:
· CAS capability = pod + bomb/gun.
· Air combat = radar and missile capability (with the performance required to get there to deliver said weapon).
One does wonder what the point is exactly.... Particularly liked the Farnborough shots with Typhoon wazzing around laden with bombs when it is very unlikely to be capable of deploying to AFG in the CAS role. Indeed, the most desired CAS platform in theatre - AC130. 5 please.
A grossly expensive and very late mess.
Thought it was also v interesting that he picked up on Wildcat. I do hope that the reason the AAC has not stuck itself with Wildcat is that it wasn't willing to take on the aircraft size/weight debate with the RAF over Blackhawk. Wildcat looks like a very effective Battlefield Recce Heli (BRH) platform. Great. But even in the unlikely event we were pitched into a conventional fight why on earth would we even need BRH when you've got Apache with a tank spotting radar.
What this SDSR sounds like it will lack is asking what you want from your heli fleet and then procuring it. One might even call such thinking a 'Strategic Review'. Col Tootal summed it up well I thought: heavy, medium and fires. So:
· Heavy: CH47. No debate there. Great trooping and CASEVAC aircraft flown well by RAF crews and bought off the shelf from Boeing.
· Fires: Apache - fires. No issues and maybe with joint crewing (as its already going). Bought off the shelf, and given to Westlands to charge a fortune to put new engines in and change the name on the manual.
· Medium: 'Blackhawk' (sized anyway). Everything else including ISTAR and limited fires. Ever seen a Blackhawk DAP! Crikey.... Could do either, buy off the shelf (hurrah), or Westlands could change the name on the manual (again) and charge £1m for each person who works there.
Does make you wonder where Merlin fits in. A huge, expensive aircraft that is only just more than ‘Medium’ capable but with no fires / ISTAR capability.
So, Wildcat. Err... Movement of 4 blokes. There's no decent weapons fitted to make it an effective fires platform (beyond crew served) and the EO is only suited for low level forward observation. So, even if it did arrive in time for AFG, you’ve got it, first UOR - an ISTAR camera.
Maybe Wildcat will get binned on Tue (along with Puma), leaving the door open for a switch to a medium heli. Would probably see this as either mixed or separate Army/RAF Sqns. Why not, it's worked in other areas... The Yanks have also very successfully fitted them with Mx cameras and weapons. Yet if that’s the game the AAC are playing I’d very surprised/impressed! Ultimately I care far less about who flies our aircraft than getting the best myriad of capabilities to support ground troops and deliver fires. If that means the AAC becomes an AH only fleet with RAF getting Blackhawk so be it. Although I would still argue (strongly) that the Army should be flying it.
Anyway, smart procurement in action...
Pongochap,
A couple of points. First of all, if manoeuverability is irrelevant in modern air combat, why is ever man and his dog, including the Russians and Chinese, developing manoeuverable aircraft, with cannards, thrust vectoring, etc... and are the Russians doing "cobra" manoeuvres at air displays.
As for UK helicopter procurement, and in particular the RAF Merlin and AAC Wildcat, blame the RN! The RN needed an ASW helicopter to replace the Sea King, which lead in turn to the ASW Merlin. Given the small numbers required by the RN, a transport version was acquired for the RAF, hence increasing the number of airframes purchased by the UK, providing better economys of scale etc, and making the cost per Merlin for the RN look slightly less horrendous.
Now fast forward a few years, until the RN needs a lynx replacement to go on the back of their few remaining frigates and destroyers. Once again the number of airframes required is tiny, and to try and help justify the expense...etc, etc, hence the AAC gets wildcat whether it wants it or not!
A couple of points. First of all, if manoeuverability is irrelevant in modern air combat, why is ever man and his dog, including the Russians and Chinese, developing manoeuverable aircraft, with cannards, thrust vectoring, etc... and are the Russians doing "cobra" manoeuvres at air displays.
As for UK helicopter procurement, and in particular the RAF Merlin and AAC Wildcat, blame the RN! The RN needed an ASW helicopter to replace the Sea King, which lead in turn to the ASW Merlin. Given the small numbers required by the RN, a transport version was acquired for the RAF, hence increasing the number of airframes purchased by the UK, providing better economys of scale etc, and making the cost per Merlin for the RN look slightly less horrendous.
Now fast forward a few years, until the RN needs a lynx replacement to go on the back of their few remaining frigates and destroyers. Once again the number of airframes required is tiny, and to try and help justify the expense...etc, etc, hence the AAC gets wildcat whether it wants it or not!
Pongochap,
Like you I'm no jetjockey, but frankly the Army's insistence that Typhoon is an expensive irrelevance does nothing but expose its corporate parochialism, whilst is persistence in pedalling this line over the years demonstrates a lack of understanding and unwillingness to learn the value and capabilities of air power.
The Typhoon was undeniably conceived in the Cold War, but that has more to do with the length of time taken to develop high tech bits of kit than any doctrinal reluctance to realise that the nature of warfare has changed. Based on the 'Cold War kit' argument, then the Blackhawk, Apache and AC-130, all of which are held in high esteem in theatre but with their roots in the Cold War are also irrelevant and have no place in 'our' inventory.
Now, what is the point of Typhoon and why do we need so many? Well, it's a swing role platform, not just AD as everyone including the PM seem to think. As such, it was intended that the Typhoon would replace multiple platform types - the F3 and the Jaguar. Based on the numbers we are getting against the numbers of F3s and Jags over the years, you'll find that it's by no means a 1-for-1 swap, and we are relying on the capability of the platform to make up for the drop in overall numbers. However, much to the apparent disgust of many outside of the RAF, we do actually still need a capable AD platform; one of, if not the primary role of the the RAF, aside from being a taxi / delivery service for everyone else, is defence of the UK and its interests. Defence of UK airspace is a key component of that. If the Army can come up with a suggestion for something cheaper, better, less manoeuvrable and less well armed that allows us to defend UK's airspace whilst retaining the key advantages of height, speed and reach, as well as being a capable deterrent against would-be aggressors then please let us know. We would be fascinated to hear where we have been going wrong all this time.
Now whilst there isn't much of an air threat in Afghanistan, that is not to say that at some point in the future that threat won't emerge. Either directly against the UK, or against UK forces deployed on operations. Just looking around the globe at many of the states that we would consider to be less than friendly will show that they have air forces made up largely of Russian kit -Fulcrums, Flankers and the like - precisely the sort of Soviet threat that is perceived as being irrelevant. So fast forward 30 years and we have cobbled together some sort of expeditionary capability to go and be a force for good somewhere.
We don't have much of an AD capability, because 30 years earlier argued it was irrelevant and we really needed Reapers and armoured vehicles, so that's where the money went. So as the helos land on the beach or the ramp comes down on the landing craft, all we will be able to do is watch as you are harassed on the beaches and HLZs by the Frogfoots or have your Chinooks shot down by a long range shot from a Flanker variant operating BVR ops. Later on you receive intelligence to suggest an HVT is going to be at a certain location at a certain time, but you can't do anything about it as you are essentially a slow moving ground based force with limited long range strike options. Equally, your troops become involved in a TiC; now most of your AH has been lost in the opening salvos, leaving you with a few armed Reapers and a couple of lightly armed Tucanos. Not a problem, other than they are operating at the otherside of the AO today, and by the time they get to your TiC it is all over. Wouldn't something fast and pointy with a long range strike option or the ability to provide rapid support multiple target sets thanks to a heavy swing role payload be a useful thing to have? Certainly not something you will get with a Super Tucano. Of course, it will probably be the RAF's fault that we couldn't secure the airspace to provide an umbrella for ground and ISTAR operations, and that ground forces are being picked off bit by bit by an enemy that over the years has understood the benefit of a decent air capability.
All very hypothetical I admit, but do you want to take the risk? Fifteen years ago, we were just coming out of the Cold War and talking about a revolution in military affairs where asymmetric, cyber warfare was the future. That theory must have lasted all of a few years before we went back to a primitive but effective enemy that wouldn't be out place in the Flintstones. The moral of the story, is for the Army to look over the parapet of its ivory towers and realise that they are not the only show in town, and without the broad spectrum of capabilities provided by its sister Services, it really won't take much for the foundations of that ivory tower to become rather unstable.
Like you I'm no jetjockey, but frankly the Army's insistence that Typhoon is an expensive irrelevance does nothing but expose its corporate parochialism, whilst is persistence in pedalling this line over the years demonstrates a lack of understanding and unwillingness to learn the value and capabilities of air power.
The Typhoon was undeniably conceived in the Cold War, but that has more to do with the length of time taken to develop high tech bits of kit than any doctrinal reluctance to realise that the nature of warfare has changed. Based on the 'Cold War kit' argument, then the Blackhawk, Apache and AC-130, all of which are held in high esteem in theatre but with their roots in the Cold War are also irrelevant and have no place in 'our' inventory.
Now, what is the point of Typhoon and why do we need so many? Well, it's a swing role platform, not just AD as everyone including the PM seem to think. As such, it was intended that the Typhoon would replace multiple platform types - the F3 and the Jaguar. Based on the numbers we are getting against the numbers of F3s and Jags over the years, you'll find that it's by no means a 1-for-1 swap, and we are relying on the capability of the platform to make up for the drop in overall numbers. However, much to the apparent disgust of many outside of the RAF, we do actually still need a capable AD platform; one of, if not the primary role of the the RAF, aside from being a taxi / delivery service for everyone else, is defence of the UK and its interests. Defence of UK airspace is a key component of that. If the Army can come up with a suggestion for something cheaper, better, less manoeuvrable and less well armed that allows us to defend UK's airspace whilst retaining the key advantages of height, speed and reach, as well as being a capable deterrent against would-be aggressors then please let us know. We would be fascinated to hear where we have been going wrong all this time.
Now whilst there isn't much of an air threat in Afghanistan, that is not to say that at some point in the future that threat won't emerge. Either directly against the UK, or against UK forces deployed on operations. Just looking around the globe at many of the states that we would consider to be less than friendly will show that they have air forces made up largely of Russian kit -Fulcrums, Flankers and the like - precisely the sort of Soviet threat that is perceived as being irrelevant. So fast forward 30 years and we have cobbled together some sort of expeditionary capability to go and be a force for good somewhere.
We don't have much of an AD capability, because 30 years earlier argued it was irrelevant and we really needed Reapers and armoured vehicles, so that's where the money went. So as the helos land on the beach or the ramp comes down on the landing craft, all we will be able to do is watch as you are harassed on the beaches and HLZs by the Frogfoots or have your Chinooks shot down by a long range shot from a Flanker variant operating BVR ops. Later on you receive intelligence to suggest an HVT is going to be at a certain location at a certain time, but you can't do anything about it as you are essentially a slow moving ground based force with limited long range strike options. Equally, your troops become involved in a TiC; now most of your AH has been lost in the opening salvos, leaving you with a few armed Reapers and a couple of lightly armed Tucanos. Not a problem, other than they are operating at the otherside of the AO today, and by the time they get to your TiC it is all over. Wouldn't something fast and pointy with a long range strike option or the ability to provide rapid support multiple target sets thanks to a heavy swing role payload be a useful thing to have? Certainly not something you will get with a Super Tucano. Of course, it will probably be the RAF's fault that we couldn't secure the airspace to provide an umbrella for ground and ISTAR operations, and that ground forces are being picked off bit by bit by an enemy that over the years has understood the benefit of a decent air capability.
All very hypothetical I admit, but do you want to take the risk? Fifteen years ago, we were just coming out of the Cold War and talking about a revolution in military affairs where asymmetric, cyber warfare was the future. That theory must have lasted all of a few years before we went back to a primitive but effective enemy that wouldn't be out place in the Flintstones. The moral of the story, is for the Army to look over the parapet of its ivory towers and realise that they are not the only show in town, and without the broad spectrum of capabilities provided by its sister Services, it really won't take much for the foundations of that ivory tower to become rather unstable.
Last edited by Melchett01; 16th Oct 2010 at 21:20.