That report covered a devastating tale of organisations that had lost their way on airworthiness. It describe a PowerPoint culture that glossed over hard questions and detailed evidence, and sacrificed safety due to incompetence, sloppiness, complacency and cynicism. The resulting catastrophe was caused as much by organisational culture as a faulty component.
Hardly the case here.
That report showed that when airworthiness issues became inconvenient because of cost or time pressures then they could be ignored or taken 'at risk'.
Entirely possible the same has happened here with SAC using pressure and contacts to persuade the regulators to accept their assertions that their MRGB was fit for purpose, even if it didn't strictly meet the FAR requirement.
If that were the case the type should be grounded. The fact that FAA have not and Shell only briefly downgraded the type to 'non-prefferred' over the MRGB churning issues, shows there is no problem.
