I think it is well accepted by all that the test was largely unprepared and also performed at an absolute inappropriate altitude.
Now, can we look further and analyze how the system did react to the erroneous AoA information ?
The BEA report is very poor in that perspective, it is evasive not to say secretive.
It seems the load factor played a crucial role in the different phases after the initial stall warning … Where is the load factor graph ?
The ELAC (Elevator Aileron Computer) needs AoA information in order to ensure the control of the elevator, the horizontal stabilizer and the ailerons, but, as we know it, that AoA information was erroneous, but considered as valid by the system ... What has been the consequence on the ELAC response to the pilot inputs ?
After the initial stall warning, the Capt side stick has been mainly forward for the first 10 seconds but the elevators barely reached the neutral position due to (according to the BEA) the load factor. Where is that load factor graph ???