Originally Posted by RIHoward
I think the pilot had the engines on full power because he was trying to avoid hitting a witness who was sitting on his tractor and when contacted in 2008 that witness said. "I had the distinct impresssion the pilot had seen me and tried to avoid hitting me" another witness was reported as saying that "the A/c almost made a perfect belly flop landing" which is supported by an article in the Times the following day which states "It is thought the pilot was attempting a landing" and the reconstruction of the flight which shows that the A/c was flying straight and descending at first rapidly and then in a "shallow" approach after it had turned 120Żby Red Hill Farm", it was flying slowly and in line with a runway. But as P Beech has said we'll never really know all we want to show is that the BoI couldn't condemn the Captain on the evidence they select because so many other bits of evidence suggest that they were trying to land the plane, and according to current Queens regulations A dead crew can only be blamed as neglegent when there is to quote: "absolutely no doubt whatsoever."
For more doubts
see.....
XD864
I've had a good read of this, as it's all rather local to me, and interesting reading it makes but I have to point out a few big holes in your interpretation.
I can't see why you think the turn was through 120 degrees rather than 180 as per the BOI PDF. An initial impact direction of 44 degrees veering to 110 degrees certainly seems to indicate the turn was nearer 180 from the initial take-off direction of 260 than the 120 you go with. Similarly, your flight path seems off, as it's drawn east of Harringworth but witness 2 says it flew over Seaton - NW of Harringworth. Mind you, witness 5 conflicts with this stating the turn was before the viaduct, east of Seaton. The witness reports are all so vague in positions and distances it is hard to make much of them really. Witness 1 in particular is no use as his location could be in any one of 11 'runway intersection' spots in the vicinity of the crash site, all of which vary the aircraft's path dramatically compared to others.
With wind reported at 350 (and this is backed up by the spread of scorching from the fire on the aerial photo of the crash site), runway 14 at Spanhoe was about the worst possible choice - shortest, tailwind, no fire cover, and poor surface quality. Recipe for disaster - particularly with a flapless approach!
With the impact point almost in the middle of the triangle of grass between the 3 runways and an initial impact heading of 44 degrees, you'd be better off making a case for them trying for a forced landing on the longest of the runways at Spanhoe (07?), which would have had much less in the way of a tailwind, though a hefty crosswind.
However... if a landing at Spanhoe was being attempted, why were the engines at high power? Why was the gear still up? If a belly landing was the intention, why was the cockpit hatch not jettisoned? Why were no radio calls made after the initial call that they were remaining in the local area to sort out the nose gear fault?
You postulate a possible fatigue fracture of a spar to explain it all - these failures did not show up on any production Valiant until August 1964, four years and a lot of flying hours later. Second prototype WB215's spar fracture in 1957 was in a different place and thought to be due to the beating the aircraft had had during its trials life - including heavy landings, wing flutter incidents, and repeated RATOG firings.
The only part of your page that I agree with is the criticism of the narrative style of the report (with its attempt to paint a picture of what might have been going on in the cockpit in those 3 brief minutes) - but it's a style used in most reports of that era.
Incidentally I see no inconsistency between "1800ft QNH" and "1000-1500 ft above airfield level (300ft)" - that's 1300-1800 ft QNH, and with multiple witnesses stating 'lower than usual' that's a pretty sensible hedging of bets. If I were being unkind I'd think you were trying a bit too hard to find "errors".
On balance, the conclusion of the report seems entirely reasonable and likely to me, and your theory so far away from likely that you need a passport, a visa and a damn long flight to get there. Interesting effort though.