Valiant crash, Wittering, August 1960
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Valiant crash, Wittering, August 1960
On the 12th August 1960 a Valiant (XD864 according to UK Serials.com) of 7 Squadron crashed after take off from Wittering. All the crew were lost.
The aircraft's pilot was Brian Wickham and my father, Harry Bullen, was, I believe, navigator.
What I know of this incident comes from my mother.
The squadron was based at Honington but was shortly to go to Wittering. In August they were operating from Wittering whilst the families were still in Suffolk.
On the 12th August, XD864 took off but was having difficulties with its undercarraige. It seems a range of procedures to solve the problem was attempted, including 'waggling' the plane, then the aircraft came down (in a potato field).
Art Field in the 'did you fly the Valiant' thread of 2007 mentions that there were peculiarities with the undercarraige, and I wondered if this could have been a factor.
I haven't been to PRO Kew yet though. I have worked at Kew before but don't know exactly where Air Crash Reports might be. I presume they would be accessable under the thirty year rule?
Any comments anyone might have on this subject would be much appreciated.
The aircraft's pilot was Brian Wickham and my father, Harry Bullen, was, I believe, navigator.
What I know of this incident comes from my mother.
The squadron was based at Honington but was shortly to go to Wittering. In August they were operating from Wittering whilst the families were still in Suffolk.
On the 12th August, XD864 took off but was having difficulties with its undercarraige. It seems a range of procedures to solve the problem was attempted, including 'waggling' the plane, then the aircraft came down (in a potato field).
Art Field in the 'did you fly the Valiant' thread of 2007 mentions that there were peculiarities with the undercarraige, and I wondered if this could have been a factor.
I haven't been to PRO Kew yet though. I have worked at Kew before but don't know exactly where Air Crash Reports might be. I presume they would be accessable under the thirty year rule?
Any comments anyone might have on this subject would be much appreciated.
There certainly seems to be a file at Kew, a search in the catalogue for XD864 came up with:
BT 233/439 Valiant B1, XD864: Spanhoe, near Wittering, Northants, 12 Aug. 1960
Philip Morten
BT 233/439 Valiant B1, XD864: Spanhoe, near Wittering, Northants, 12 Aug. 1960
Philip Morten
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I've now seen the document BT233/439 - RAF Investigation into Aircraft Accident.
For completeness I thought I'd post the basic information.
XD 864 took off from Wittering at 1035, Friday 12th August 1960, for a routine six hour exercise. The crew was Flt Lt B J Wickham, captain and 1st Pilot; Flt Lt W R Howard, 2nd pilot (on loan from 138 squadron); Flt Lt H G Bullen, navigator/plotter; Flt Lt A J Ireson, navigator/radar; Sgt R H Johnson, air electronics.
As the plane went up the nose wheel wouldn't retract. The captain was aware of this and was going to attempt to sort it out. He intended to enter the Wittering circuit and so banked to port but low airspeed caused the plane to stall and it came down on the disused Spanhoe airfield (which at the time still had three runways). The fuel tanks disintegrated and most of the plane was consummed by fire, including the cockpit and all five crew.
If anyone wants any more information, they are welcome to contact me.
For completeness I thought I'd post the basic information.
XD 864 took off from Wittering at 1035, Friday 12th August 1960, for a routine six hour exercise. The crew was Flt Lt B J Wickham, captain and 1st Pilot; Flt Lt W R Howard, 2nd pilot (on loan from 138 squadron); Flt Lt H G Bullen, navigator/plotter; Flt Lt A J Ireson, navigator/radar; Sgt R H Johnson, air electronics.
As the plane went up the nose wheel wouldn't retract. The captain was aware of this and was going to attempt to sort it out. He intended to enter the Wittering circuit and so banked to port but low airspeed caused the plane to stall and it came down on the disused Spanhoe airfield (which at the time still had three runways). The fuel tanks disintegrated and most of the plane was consummed by fire, including the cockpit and all five crew.
If anyone wants any more information, they are welcome to contact me.
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My Father was Roy H Johnson, a member of the crew on this plane. I was amazed to find this thred as I know little about what happend. I am looking to make contact with others who were affected.
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An article on this incident can be found at John Dillon's Vulcan site:
http://www.john-dillon.co.uk/V-Force/valiant_xd864.html
http://www.john-dillon.co.uk/V-Force/valiant_xd864.html
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Looks like my father was piloting the plane for the take off.
The valiant was taken off V-bombing not long after 1960 (not sure when)
and put onto tanker duty, and then retired. Was the Valiant designed for high level bombing? and then switched to below radar flight when the Russians brought SAM's into service? Would this have any baring on the airframe?
I was 20 months old when my dad died in this crash, but I think it has had an influence on my life, mainly through the emotional toll felt by my mum, the attitudes of my wider family towards me. I think it has had a much deeper impact on my brother who was 4 and a half in August 1960.
The valiant was taken off V-bombing not long after 1960 (not sure when)
and put onto tanker duty, and then retired. Was the Valiant designed for high level bombing? and then switched to below radar flight when the Russians brought SAM's into service? Would this have any baring on the airframe?
I was 20 months old when my dad died in this crash, but I think it has had an influence on my life, mainly through the emotional toll felt by my mum, the attitudes of my wider family towards me. I think it has had a much deeper impact on my brother who was 4 and a half in August 1960.
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R I Howard. The Valiant continued as a Bomber as well as a Tanker until 1964 when the fleet was grounded after a Valiant broke its main spar on a training sortie out of Gaydon, the training unit. Yes the latter part of its life included low level but inspections of all Valiants after the grounding showed that regardless of their use the whole fleet was affected by metal fatigue in the main spar and that was why they were scrapped. I am not aware that there were any suspicions that other Valiant accidents were due to this problem and the reports on this particular incident point to a very different cause.
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Remember the Comet?
Art Field
Thanks for the reply.
I guess you know about the Comet here is one of many incidents
Canadian Pacific Airlines Comet 1A (CF-CUN) was being delivered, and on take-off from Karachi, Pakistan collided with a bridge, killing 11 crew and others on board. These accidents were originally attributed to pilot error: over-rotation had led to a loss of lift from the leading edge of the plane's wing. However, it was later determined that the wing profile led to a loss of lift at high angle of attack, and the engine inlets suffered from a lack of pressure recovery in these conditions as well.
This was 1952 and it's not clear how much later that the fault with the wing profile was discovered.
Sounds similar to the crash of Valiant XD864.
i.e. the take off was steeper than normal and sounded quieter.
"loss of lift at high angle of attack, and the engine inlets suffered from a lack of pressure recovery in these conditions"
Could the fatigue also affect the wings ability to supply lift? if they weren't quite so "stiff" as they were supposed to be?
And what about that feature of all early British multi engine jets, of putting the engines in the wings close to the fuselage, no one builds jets like that anymore. Do they?
The Board of Trade are not going to report that there was a design flaw with the Valiant certainly not while the Warsaw pact were watching. The fact is there clearly was a design flaw and that led to their removal from service in 1964. That fact, and the similarity of the design to that of the Comet suggest to me that it was the plane that was at fault and not Flight Lieutenant Brian J Wickham. He was very experienced and he had a very experienced crew (except for my dad) and obviously met something he had not experienced before on that day, he would have known what to do if the front undercarriage failed to retract as there were other similar incidents that didn't lead to fatal accidents with the Valiant.
Do you know anything about the trials involving rocket boosters and other aids for take off that took place in 1959?
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...0&Summary=True
Cheers
R I Howard
Thanks for the reply.
I guess you know about the Comet here is one of many incidents
Canadian Pacific Airlines Comet 1A (CF-CUN) was being delivered, and on take-off from Karachi, Pakistan collided with a bridge, killing 11 crew and others on board. These accidents were originally attributed to pilot error: over-rotation had led to a loss of lift from the leading edge of the plane's wing. However, it was later determined that the wing profile led to a loss of lift at high angle of attack, and the engine inlets suffered from a lack of pressure recovery in these conditions as well.
This was 1952 and it's not clear how much later that the fault with the wing profile was discovered.
Sounds similar to the crash of Valiant XD864.
i.e. the take off was steeper than normal and sounded quieter.
"loss of lift at high angle of attack, and the engine inlets suffered from a lack of pressure recovery in these conditions"
Could the fatigue also affect the wings ability to supply lift? if they weren't quite so "stiff" as they were supposed to be?
And what about that feature of all early British multi engine jets, of putting the engines in the wings close to the fuselage, no one builds jets like that anymore. Do they?
The Board of Trade are not going to report that there was a design flaw with the Valiant certainly not while the Warsaw pact were watching. The fact is there clearly was a design flaw and that led to their removal from service in 1964. That fact, and the similarity of the design to that of the Comet suggest to me that it was the plane that was at fault and not Flight Lieutenant Brian J Wickham. He was very experienced and he had a very experienced crew (except for my dad) and obviously met something he had not experienced before on that day, he would have known what to do if the front undercarriage failed to retract as there were other similar incidents that didn't lead to fatal accidents with the Valiant.
Do you know anything about the trials involving rocket boosters and other aids for take off that took place in 1959?
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...0&Summary=True
Cheers
R I Howard
“Don’t worry about it, chaps. 217’s just a one off.” My squadron commander addressing us aircrew after we had been told what had happened to WP 217’s main spar. The B of I for the accident at Market Rasen in May 1964 was reopened on this evidence but it was not found to be a factor, they were still sticking to a tailplane actuator runaway. WP217’s crew were very lucky that the spar split sufficiently to disconnect the starboard flap drive otherwise it could well have twisted the wing and made it terminally uncontrollable at 2000ft..
The undercarriage was a Heath Robinson affair, as was most of the aircraft. Electrically driven, each leg had a main motor driving a screw jack and piggy-backed onto it was a smaller emergency motor, the same with the doors. Should this fail then the extreme emergency system, one switch for each main leg only, would blow away the uplocks, allowing the door to swing down and probably off and then the leg would be driven down by the main motor. A 543 Sqn Valiant did a wheels-up at Manston because they couldn’t get a main leg down using all three systems. Subsequently it was found out that the switches had been cross-wired so all they did was blow off the locks of the leg that was already down.
The stalling speed for a B1 at a TOW of 167,000 lbs with T/O flap was about 125 knots, going up quite rapidly with applied bank. With the undercarriage unlocked the limit was 170 knots so there so there was not much of a gap with 30° of bank on. There was little or no warning, I know that from personal experience, but fortunately in my case the aircraft rolled out of the turn. You were wasting your time trying to get the gear down with G. There’s no way it will force screw jacks around.
The main spars failing in 1964 were not as a result of a design flaw. There was insufficient knowledge about the behaviour of the alloys they were using. Reportedly there was a main spar assembly at Weybridge that had never been installed and that was as bad as the rest.
At about 175,000 lbs the unstick was about 145 knots and the technique was to start pulling the control spectacle at at 120 knots so that the nosewheel lifted at 130 and then pull it off at 145. If you were very light the biggest problem was over rotating and scraping the tail. Scraping the tail was also a flapless landing hazard.
She was a nice old girl to fly, being on tankers I saw a lot of the old Commonwealth but of the five accidents I can remember four were all very sudden and all the crews perished. On the fifth, a spectacular take off from Offut, they should have done but they all walked away from it.
The undercarriage was a Heath Robinson affair, as was most of the aircraft. Electrically driven, each leg had a main motor driving a screw jack and piggy-backed onto it was a smaller emergency motor, the same with the doors. Should this fail then the extreme emergency system, one switch for each main leg only, would blow away the uplocks, allowing the door to swing down and probably off and then the leg would be driven down by the main motor. A 543 Sqn Valiant did a wheels-up at Manston because they couldn’t get a main leg down using all three systems. Subsequently it was found out that the switches had been cross-wired so all they did was blow off the locks of the leg that was already down.
The stalling speed for a B1 at a TOW of 167,000 lbs with T/O flap was about 125 knots, going up quite rapidly with applied bank. With the undercarriage unlocked the limit was 170 knots so there so there was not much of a gap with 30° of bank on. There was little or no warning, I know that from personal experience, but fortunately in my case the aircraft rolled out of the turn. You were wasting your time trying to get the gear down with G. There’s no way it will force screw jacks around.
The main spars failing in 1964 were not as a result of a design flaw. There was insufficient knowledge about the behaviour of the alloys they were using. Reportedly there was a main spar assembly at Weybridge that had never been installed and that was as bad as the rest.
At about 175,000 lbs the unstick was about 145 knots and the technique was to start pulling the control spectacle at at 120 knots so that the nosewheel lifted at 130 and then pull it off at 145. If you were very light the biggest problem was over rotating and scraping the tail. Scraping the tail was also a flapless landing hazard.
She was a nice old girl to fly, being on tankers I saw a lot of the old Commonwealth but of the five accidents I can remember four were all very sudden and all the crews perished. On the fifth, a spectacular take off from Offut, they should have done but they all walked away from it.
Carrying on a bit further the rocket boosters, Sprite rockets if I remember correctly, were a bit of a waste as you had to return to the airfield to jettison them before you could carry on. The R/R Avon 205 had water-meth injection that gave you 8,300 rpm instead of 8,000 and another 1,000 lbs of thrust for 45 seconds. Towards the end of its life the 205A came along that allowed you to over-rev the engine to 8,200 rpm to cater for most of the loss of thrust if the water-meth failed on one engine.
Still took an awful lot of runway in the tropics. Though not as bad as the Victor Mk1.
Still took an awful lot of runway in the tropics. Though not as bad as the Victor Mk1.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
The Valiant problem was nothing to do with metal fatigue in the expected sense like the Comet or aircraft at low level.
The lightweight alloys used for the main spar had an inherent failure. They would crystalise when formed and became fatigued whether fitted to an aircraft of not.
After the fleet was grounded systematic checks were made on all the aircraft. A trials aircraft, with just 5 hrs on the clock, was about to be given a green light when they removed just one more rivet to be sure. Cracks were found and that was that.
Checks were made on spare spars and they too exhibited the same fatigue failures.
The lightweight alloys used for the main spar had an inherent failure. They would crystalise when formed and became fatigued whether fitted to an aircraft of not.
After the fleet was grounded systematic checks were made on all the aircraft. A trials aircraft, with just 5 hrs on the clock, was about to be given a green light when they removed just one more rivet to be sure. Cracks were found and that was that.
Checks were made on spare spars and they too exhibited the same fatigue failures.
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“Don’t worry about it, chaps. 217’s just a one off.”
Fareastdriver
Thanks very much for passing on you're experiences and knowledge
“Don’t worry about it, chaps. 217’s just a one off.”
Did you believe him?
"WP217’s crew were very lucky that the spar split sufficiently to disconnect the starboard flap drive otherwise it could well have twisted the wing and made it terminally uncontrollable at 2000ft"..
Without reopening the B of I, Do you think the main spar braking was a more likely cause than the reasons laid out by the B o I? XD864 had completed its turn and had levelled off then began a rapid decent the port wing then dipped.
Does this sound like the characteristics of a stall to you?
The plane levelled again and the Captain increased power the nose came up and then fell in a shallow dive the port wing dipped again this time hitting the ground. Again this description seems, to me, to reflect the Captain struggling to fly a broken aeroplane.
What do you think?
"but fortunately in my case the aircraft rolled out of the turn"
Would that have happened if the main spar broke?
Cheers
R I Howard
Thanks very much for passing on you're experiences and knowledge
“Don’t worry about it, chaps. 217’s just a one off.”
Did you believe him?
"WP217’s crew were very lucky that the spar split sufficiently to disconnect the starboard flap drive otherwise it could well have twisted the wing and made it terminally uncontrollable at 2000ft"..
Without reopening the B of I, Do you think the main spar braking was a more likely cause than the reasons laid out by the B o I? XD864 had completed its turn and had levelled off then began a rapid decent the port wing then dipped.
Does this sound like the characteristics of a stall to you?
The plane levelled again and the Captain increased power the nose came up and then fell in a shallow dive the port wing dipped again this time hitting the ground. Again this description seems, to me, to reflect the Captain struggling to fly a broken aeroplane.
What do you think?
"but fortunately in my case the aircraft rolled out of the turn"
Would that have happened if the main spar broke?
Cheers
R I Howard
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Fatigue
O.K so the airframe was weaker than expected because of the crystalline structure of the alloy after it was formed (cast?) leading to cracks being easily propagated along crystal boundaries?.
All 5 Valiant crashes occurred on take-off. I think?
So I guess the most likely time for failure would be when the airframe is under the heaviest stress - take off with a large TOW?. In the case of
XD864 the take off was steeper than normal, at full power and the fuel load was 83% or there abouts.
Are these conditions the ones that stress the airframe most?
Thanks for your answers guys.
All 5 Valiant crashes occurred on take-off. I think?
So I guess the most likely time for failure would be when the airframe is under the heaviest stress - take off with a large TOW?. In the case of
XD864 the take off was steeper than normal, at full power and the fuel load was 83% or there abouts.
Are these conditions the ones that stress the airframe most?
Thanks for your answers guys.
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R I Howard. There will always be aircraft accidents where the cause can not be stated with 100% certainty and this is true of the Wittering crash. The inquiry will then examine all the facts they have available and come out with the most likely cause. The facts point most strongly to indicate the aircraft was allowed to lose flying speed and subsequently stalled at too low a level to allow recovery. There was no indication of structural failure and the speed and attitude would not have placed undue stress on the airframe. The situation shows a possibility of classic "Distraction" where a relatively minor incident takes over as the main priority and attention is lost on flying the aircraft, sadly not an uncommon occurrence.
This may not be the opinion you want to hear but I think you should consider it the most likely explanation of the crash.
This may not be the opinion you want to hear but I think you should consider it the most likely explanation of the crash.
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not all the facts were available in 1960
The fault with the alloy only emerged in 1964 so the B o I didn't have all the facts in 1960 (I think Vickers and the MOD knew though) .
I need to do more research, but it seems from what I've found so far main spar failure had occurred in Valiants prior to this crash and later as reported by a test co-pilot.
from
http://www.vectorsite.net/avval.html
"* Some years back, ..... I was contacted by an Australian who told me he had been test copilot on a Valiant when the wing spar broke. It didn't give way and the aircraft managed to get back down to the ground in one piece."
in 1964 when the full seriousness of the problem was realised the whole fleet was grounded, I think that fact alone is compelling. So I'm going with main spar failure, you can believe the B o I if you like. I guess we have to agree to differ, but I'm going to go on digging ;-)
ATB
RIH
I need to do more research, but it seems from what I've found so far main spar failure had occurred in Valiants prior to this crash and later as reported by a test co-pilot.
from
http://www.vectorsite.net/avval.html
"* Some years back, ..... I was contacted by an Australian who told me he had been test copilot on a Valiant when the wing spar broke. It didn't give way and the aircraft managed to get back down to the ground in one piece."
in 1964 when the full seriousness of the problem was realised the whole fleet was grounded, I think that fact alone is compelling. So I'm going with main spar failure, you can believe the B o I if you like. I guess we have to agree to differ, but I'm going to go on digging ;-)
ATB
RIH
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Art Field
What do you know about the Valiant wing spar failure at Gaydon? Did the wing seperate?
On 29/4/57 The second Valiant prototype -215- had developed a fatigue crack in the bottom main spar cap through about 30% of its cross section. The rest broke under the stress of an AUW flight at 210 KIAS and about 20 degrees of bank in slight turbulence preceding the first seperation trials of two Super Sprites that had just been fired to measure take off performance.
We were carrying two 1600 gallon tanks filled with jettisonable water and another 1,000 gallons in the weapons bay to get to about 170,000 pnds AUW. The Super Srites gave us an extra 8,000 pnds of thrust over about 50 seconds for the measured take off.
The spar let go with a terrific bang and shock and the Valiant started to roll into the broken wing. This trimmed out OK and we three on board believed that our chase Meteor 7 had rammed us. Its pilot reassured us to the contrary so the next surmise was that one of the Super Sprites had not completed its purge of its excess High Test Peroxide oxident which may have exploded. One SS we had on closed circuit TV looked alright so we went ahead with individual seperation trials without delay and commenced water jettison, wanting to go to ground ASAP. We drenched Boscombe Down's runway and taxiways with water and considerable relief to be down but still not knowing what diabolical thing had occurred.
The fracture of the spar was soon located at the focus of pulled wing skin rivets and skin shedding just aft of the R main wheel well. Following defuelling and jacking with wing jacks the spar opened up with a gap of about an inch so that we could examine the fracture surfaces. The tide marks of fatigue crack growth were obvious and the remainder of the spar had broken under tension. The gap in the spar in flight was about 2 inches which would have extended the dihedral by about 3 degrees.
We had been saved from wing seperation by a steel cross brace extending from the top of a forward sub-spar to the main spar bottom cap outboard of the break.
In retrospect, if we had known that a wing spar had broken, we would not have jettisoned the water from the underwing tanks as their weight outboard would have been relieving moments on the wings. But perhaps instead we would have given our FTE an opportunity to use his parachute before leaving the only surviving prototype to her own devices.
I guess 215 eventually went to the recyclers!
What do you know about the Valiant wing spar failure at Gaydon? Did the wing seperate?
On 29/4/57 The second Valiant prototype -215- had developed a fatigue crack in the bottom main spar cap through about 30% of its cross section. The rest broke under the stress of an AUW flight at 210 KIAS and about 20 degrees of bank in slight turbulence preceding the first seperation trials of two Super Sprites that had just been fired to measure take off performance.
We were carrying two 1600 gallon tanks filled with jettisonable water and another 1,000 gallons in the weapons bay to get to about 170,000 pnds AUW. The Super Srites gave us an extra 8,000 pnds of thrust over about 50 seconds for the measured take off.
The spar let go with a terrific bang and shock and the Valiant started to roll into the broken wing. This trimmed out OK and we three on board believed that our chase Meteor 7 had rammed us. Its pilot reassured us to the contrary so the next surmise was that one of the Super Sprites had not completed its purge of its excess High Test Peroxide oxident which may have exploded. One SS we had on closed circuit TV looked alright so we went ahead with individual seperation trials without delay and commenced water jettison, wanting to go to ground ASAP. We drenched Boscombe Down's runway and taxiways with water and considerable relief to be down but still not knowing what diabolical thing had occurred.
The fracture of the spar was soon located at the focus of pulled wing skin rivets and skin shedding just aft of the R main wheel well. Following defuelling and jacking with wing jacks the spar opened up with a gap of about an inch so that we could examine the fracture surfaces. The tide marks of fatigue crack growth were obvious and the remainder of the spar had broken under tension. The gap in the spar in flight was about 2 inches which would have extended the dihedral by about 3 degrees.
We had been saved from wing seperation by a steel cross brace extending from the top of a forward sub-spar to the main spar bottom cap outboard of the break.
In retrospect, if we had known that a wing spar had broken, we would not have jettisoned the water from the underwing tanks as their weight outboard would have been relieving moments on the wings. But perhaps instead we would have given our FTE an opportunity to use his parachute before leaving the only surviving prototype to her own devices.
I guess 215 eventually went to the recyclers!
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Hi
Hello Richard,
It's good to make contact with you. My father died in that crash too and having read the report I am very saddened by very sad state of events. I am nevertheless very interested in your comments. regardig the crash. I would love to hear from you. I have been in touch with Michael Bullen for some time now. There has been a lot of suffering as a result of this crash and it seems very special to me to have this contact with you and Michael.
All the best,
Carol
It's good to make contact with you. My father died in that crash too and having read the report I am very saddened by very sad state of events. I am nevertheless very interested in your comments. regardig the crash. I would love to hear from you. I have been in touch with Michael Bullen for some time now. There has been a lot of suffering as a result of this crash and it seems very special to me to have this contact with you and Michael.
All the best,
Carol