Hi,
They were bent over the barrel with their underpants around their ankles long before the sensors sneaked up behind them.
The report describes a comedy of errors which should never have even started. Leave test flying to test pilots, they are trained and paid to expect and understand the unexpected. Starting a stall manoever at low altitude was only the last piece of idiocy in this tale of foolishness.
It does not matter how foolproof you make the machine, the world will breed a better idiot to outwit you.
Knowing the experience of these pilots does they can still make so many errors .. This is sobering
Experience of the CBD:
- 12 709 flying hours, including 7,038 on type. 128 hours in the last three months, all on type. 14 hours within thirty days, all on type. Any flight time in the past 24 hours.?
- Service time: End of the last service before the accident flight: 2 November 2008 21 h 24. • Start of service on the day of the accident: 4 h 30. • Resting time: 13:30 min.
Experience of co-pilot:
- 11 660 flying hours, including 5,529 on type. / 192 hours in the last three months, all on type. / 18 hours within thirty days, all on type. / No hours flying time in the past 24 hours.
- Service time: End of the last service before the accident flight: November 4, 2008 at 20 h 52. / Start the service on the day of the accident: 4 h 30. / Rest time: 120 h.
Or maybe .. it's also other factors at play
From a french page:
While the low speed tests were carried out in haste, it is also true that the crew was not alerted that two probes were blocked effect. This is a serious anomaly. Indeed, if the pilots had been warned that two probes were blocked effect, they never sought to test the proper operation of protection systems in which these probes are the main element.
The certification document SC 25 requires in its Subsection 1309 (c) that pilots are informed of any failure so they can take appropriate action.
CS 25.1309 (c) Information concerning unsafe conditions Operating System Must Be Provided To The Theme to enable crew to take corrective action appropriée. A warning indication Must Be Provided if immediate corrective action IS required. Systems and Control, Including indications and Annunciation Must Be Designed to minimize crew errors, Which Could create Additional hazards
The pilots did not have a visual alarm and / or sound informing them of the unavailability of two probes impact which is contrary to the standards required for certification. The BEA does not say in his report.
Page 16 of its report, the BEA dares say: "Between 15 and 15 h 04 h 06, the probes of incidence 1 and 2 are blocked and remain frozen until the end of the flight to values affect local quasi- identical and consistent with values of incidence of cruising without the crew perceive it. " It should of course read "without the crew being informed." It is intellectually dishonest.
The blocking of 2 probes incident resulted in the miscalculation of the characteristic speeds (and Vαprot Vαmax), rejection of ADR 3, the direct passage into law and made inoperative automatic compensation. This succession of automation in a very complex system has not been seen by the crew. The pilots did not understand what was happening. (Remember Habsheim, Bangalore, Ste Odile, Congonhas ..., the pilots did not understand what was happening.)
If the BEA agrees that "the real situation of the global aircraft was not known to the crew," he does not question the technology as the Airbus CENIP Brazil has in its report on the accident an A 320 of the company TAM July 17, 2007: "The Automation Of The aircraft, however complex, capable of Providing Was Not The Pilot With sufficiently clear and Accurate stimuli, To The Point of favoring Their Understanding of What Was Happening In The moments just the after the landing in Congonhas "
The BEA also forgot to mention that feedback has still failed because two similar events took place in a French company before the crash of Perpignan. If all players in the accident on 27 November 2008 had benefited from these lessons learned, good awareness and good safety, it would have saved seven people dead and a plane.
Les dossiers noirs du transport aérien