NoD - I don't believe any of us question your assertion that this accident was an unlikely candidate for recurrence nor that human error was a major cause of it.
What I believe ConF and I are expressing surprise at is the apparent 'disdain' (for want of a better word) that the system directs at what is its core safety feature. I appreciate that you appeared (#1277) to play down the importance of AoA in the AB operation, but to we 'outside' observers we have been repeatedly fed ?proganda? about how the aircraft is unstallable, which we now know to be not true. You know - "you just pull back on the stick and it looks after you" etc. - how many times have I heard that? From what I gather the a/c produces reams of 'writing' about other system failures. Where would this crew have been if they had not attempted the stall check but had a hard terrain warning and had done just that? Surely the first they might have known would be excessive pitch, low speed and a few hundred feet above the hard stuff?
I do not believe either of us want a plethora of 'green writing' for every fault, but I certainly would like to know if my machine had such queries about its significant inputs and I would like to think that such a warning would have changed my plans for the way I flew the rest of the flight.
I think we just disagree on whether this accident should have been warned against/prevented?
- yes - in my case I do. 'Against' yes, 'prevented' - who knows?