However, if the outline of this accident could be (even partially) translated into a "normal ops" flight, then that might produce lessons worth addressing.
NoD,
I think you’re a bit too eager to blame the crew but don’t realize how during a "normal approach" level at 3000 AGL you could end up 20 knots below your minimum clean speed just because the system did not deem necessary to warn you that maybe something was wrong … isn’t it a matter of concern for you ?
Given the number of injuries resulting from a safety-critical system anomaly (a couple of broken bones and some serious bruises at Learmonth)
PBL,
You seem to take that event a bit lightly, being on that QF flight would have felt probably differently. But the point is : Why do you compare with the different events you mention, would you develop a bit more ?
PJ2,
Once again, I'll have to come back later, sorry.