mm43;
If the AoA sensor disagree had been flagged, then at least the "question" would have been raised about the desirability of doing what they did.
Perhaps but I would like to offer a thought: How far does such a regression continue for similar problems and their cockpit indications and the "expected" pilot response, especially in line operations?
The Report already suggests that this "test flight" was not a requirement of any law and was an informal arrangement; the flight was being conducted as a Test Flight but the crew was not familiar with the procedures and didn't adhere to the Airbus test flight requirements.
Some have already said that the Airbus approach is too complicated, that the stream of cautions/warnings when something goes wrong can already overwhelm. As a few have observed, in ordinary line ops, two malfunctioning AoA sensors would not have made a difference to bread-and-butter flight. I agree.
The question about
the desirability of doing what they did was raised the moment they reversed their decision to do the Alpha exercise on the way to Germany, and instead elected to do it below 3000ft while on final approach. Nobody among the seven participants raised the question.
Under such decision-making processes, how many dozens/hundreds of other aircraft system abnormal-performance circumstances should be covered before it is enough? What system could be the next "culprit"? Not disagreeing or agreeing with anything suggested but asking the question.
Someone else mentioned pitch problems and trim being the first thing to look at - the motion of the trim wheel in the A320 is easily seen; the wheel is very easy to roll forward or backward and it changes the trim quite quickly. I can't recall if the report addresses this possbility for a potential recovery.
infrequentflyer789;
Thanks for taking a moment to contribute. Perhaps its best to leave it at that unless of course corrections/edits are needed.
CONF iture;
Keep the guys in the loop !
A very important point is being missed here and I disagree with you that the point has been understood...some are not getting it, or if they are, they're saying, "yes, but..." and ignoring the implications of the question.
Without addressing the very issues raised regarding this set of circumstances, how do you propose to "keep the guys in the loop"? What is the "correct" infomation and how is it obtained?
Further, you urge
keeping it simple and then ask for more complexity to be loaded onto the pilot. If not this system which it is proposed "has a warning", which next system requires the same, to accomplish the same purpose? How does the designer make that decision and why?
My question to
mm43 above applies equally to your suggestion. How much and how far would you decide to "keep the guys in the loop!"; what would be the ECAM actions or aircraft restrictions and upon what would such outcomes of such failure be based?
Given the complexity of such systems as flight controls, engine control and ELAC/SEC/FAC or PRIM performance to name just a few, the same claims (keep the guys informed) could be made for many cases in flight near/at extreme performance limits - a place where no line crew has any business being. What then, are the arguments in this case for increasing complexity of warning presentation, analysis and appropriate response for the crew? At some point downstream, the complexity of training and ensuring high standards of response must be considered. Airbus already hides all Class 3 Maintenance messages, the fault-message inclusion of which I'm sure was an engineering decision based upon a failure mode analysis.
I think that is why the discussion took the turn it did...because it is more relevant than we thought, it isn't that simple and perhaps under line operations perhaps for these reasons, isn't necessary
but understanding why, is important.
The goal as you say is to keep it simple. Perhaps this is exactly what is happening.
PJ2