that the High AoA protections did/do not function with a single AoA input, but the stall warning does? I cannot understand the logic.
I have better things to do than read the manuals which you are making me do
3 AoA sensors respectivly go to 3 ADIRUS, all 3 of these are inputs to the Flight Control Computers. We are not privvy to how the readings are combined / prioritised. I suspect the report does go into more detail. However, I would say:
- To action High AoA protections you need to be pretty sure you have High AoA i.e. a single rogue High AoA value must not lead to a pitch down etc. There may be more on this if you read up the IB A320 Bilbao incident, and the QF A330?
- A STALL Warning is for crew assessment, and can be ignored. It is therefore more appropriate for a single AoA value to generate it, as happened here.
So my view would be the logic seems fairly good here?
NoD