Thank you kindly, oh wise one.
I find it difficult to reconcile the pre-amble to Rec. 4 with the events between 15:45:19 and 15:45:23 - that does not look to me like
'impossible for the crew to be aware of the situation and to recover control of the aeroplane'
It looks as if all was going comparatively well at that time, and the failure to maintain forward stick, throttle back and trim then sealed their fate.
Is 99kts a realistic speed for a stall warning at that weight?
You say 'Good job the logic did not outvote that one, which remained and gave the (correct) STALL warning.' - surely it WAS 'outvoted'?
'However, the blockage of angle of attack sensors 1 and 2 at identical values had inhibited the functioning of these protections and led to an erroneous display of the characteristic speeds of these protections.'
to me says We will ignore AoA 3 until the actual stall warning? Back to the point that those of us (probably fortunately lacking in experience of this type) are making - is it not sensible to ask a system to make it clear that what systems you thought you had were obviously not in fact there - a fact really made clear only to the aircraft? I would wager that an average crew, given this information, might not rely on them.
This is not just about a rare event caused by incorrect washing. This goes to the heart of a system which encourages absolute confidence in Msr Ziegler's concierge's undoubted ability and then 'blows a raspberry' at the poor crew. We still do not know if or what 'automatic' dumping of information brought down 447 - and probably never will..