The comment of the Polish Board in the final report:
(crew "A" was landing in KTW, crew "B" continued to WAW.)
The Commission draws attention to the unethical behaviour of the crew "A" in relation to
Crew 'B' and failure of current procedures contained in the
Operator Procedures, and international law. The Commission is aware that the crew of the "A"
was in a very big stress after landing, but comparing the damage to the
aircraft, damage to the runway edge lights and the grass
loading it seems unlikely that the crew was not aware
they rolled off the runway. You must emphasize here the importance of
mutual trust and the importance of the flight crew compliance with operating procedures,
which are the final barrier to prevent the occurrence of aviation incident or accident.
In light of all the analysis you must
note that although the captain is
entitled to delegate tasks to his crew and "other
skilled staff" it, after all, that power does not release him, or his F/O from the requirement to comply with the pre-flight check of the aircraft as
described in the procedures of the Operator. Loading Crew 'A' has not completed
the notification of the incident, and did not transfer ABSOLUTELY NO information and comments to the crew of "B"
and the lack of implementation of the PDI procedure by the crew of "B" - because of her confidence
to the crew of "A" - testified to the lack of awareness of the current technical condition of the
plane. As a result, made a flight from KTW to WAW on a malfunctioning airplane.
This whole chain of events led to a big threat to the flight safety
the return flight to WAW and, as a further consequence, the execution of subsequent three commercial flights
without the implementation of the structural review of the aircraft as prescribed by the "after hard landing" procedure.
(sorry for my poor translation)