I wouldn't like to see this thread contaminated with discussion about a non-relevant accident, but it seems as if things might be going that way. Let me try to head it off by referring to some real work which was done on the Cali accident, and suggest that those of us who wish to discuss the nearly fifteen-year-old accident start a new thread, say in the "Safety" Forum?
Originally Posted by aterpster
But, we do about AAL 965. That crew did it to themselves beyond any doubt.
Not so. Many other factors were involved. The Texas court found that the FMS manufacturer and the nav database supplier were also responsible. Further responsibility lies with the Colombian government for installed two NDBs with identical frequencies and idents within reception range of each other, and with the controller for replying "affirmative" to the mistaken readback of a clearance (indeed, the readback clearance could physically not be flown).
Then there were presupposition problems in the crew's intuitive understanding of how approaches are named, which caused some confusion. That is nobody's fault, least of all the crew's. See the cult paper
Cali Conversation Comments
Originally Posted by aterpster
The Cali controller did nothing wrong.
Also not so, as mentioned in the last sentence of the above paragraph.
We digitised the Cali report, which was offered to us by a contact at the NTSB who read the above paper, and performed a Why-Because Analysis of the accident, from which the above is derived. All available through
AG RVS - Computer-Related Incidents with Commercial Aircraft
It's nice to know that work we did 14 years ago is still relevant.
PBL