36. We saw notes taken of the meeting on 7 September 2000. Captain Leslie gave details of his complaints and what he had done to pursue them. They are recorded as a measured exchange of views and there was no record of any untoward appearance or behaviour on Captain Leslie’s part. In fact the notes end with Captain Leslie saying it may have been an “oversiqht on my part not to contact a Manager.”
37. Captain Lawrie determined that the matter required further explanation ‘and so he telephoned Captain Leslie on 8 September 2000 and advised him to attend a formal disciplinary interview on 13 September 2000. He described Captain Leslie as angry and aggressive and when told that he could be accompanied asked that a CAA or BALPA representative he present. He also said that he wanted to be represented by a solicitor.
38. On 9 September 2000 an e-mail was sent by Captain Leslie saying that Captain Clarke would represent him and that he had made BALPA aware of the position. A letter was sent by Captain Leslie 11 September 2000 to Austin Reid, Group Managing Director stating the position and complaining of a lack of information on what he is accused of and the formal nature of the meeting on 7 September 2000.
39 On 11 September 2000 a letter was sent by Captain Lawrie requiring him to attend a meeting on 13 September 2000. This was stated in a further letter from Rhona Coe of 12 September 2000 as being to ascertain the facts and that he is “off programme.”
Case No: 2600427/01
40. As Captain C!arke could not attend the meeting on 13 September 2000 it was postponed to 25 September 2000. What happened at the meeting was in dispute between the parties. we read the notes prepared by Rhona Coe and also notes by Captain Leslie, Apart from Captain Clarke being recorded as shouting a response at one point the minutes record Captain Leslie stating his case and nothing is recorded as to Captain Leslie’s conduct or attitude. We preferred Captain Leslie’s notes of the meeting which are more detailed.
41. On 27 September 2000 Captain Lawrie tried to contact Captain Leslie and through Captain Clarke arranged a further meeting for 29 September 2000. This meeting was attended by Captain Lawrie, Rhona Coe, Captain Robertson, Captain Clarke and Captain Leslie. It was explained that Captain Leslie would be given a written warning for the events of 1 September 2000. At the meeting Captain Leslie handed in a letter instituting an appeal. The ‘warning was confirmed by a letter of 29 September 2000 which was written after the meeting. The letter complains of the manner in which Captain Leslie’s complaint about FTL was raised both in the reference to the Internet site and the language used in relation to Chief Operations Manager Hogan and Flight Officer Hill. There is nothing, however, in the letter to record that Captain Leslie was considered unable to fly. indeed, Captain Lawrie said in evidence that he hoped that Captain Leslie would return to work the next day.
42. lt was an integral part of the “One List” to allow banter and free communication between parties. Captain Hills had confirmed when joining that he had understood this and that he was potentially open to banter criticising him if the pilots so chose. Captain Leslie’s appeal letter was repeated to Captain Linekar by a letter of 1 October 2000. However, at the end of the meeting on 29 September 2001 what was said between the parties was a matter of significant dispute. We heard from Captain Lawrie, Captain Leslie and Captain Clarke about this. Captain Lawrie reported that Captain Leslie had said he was “too stressed to be near an aeroplane.” We do not believe that Captain Leslie said this. It would be hard to understand how Captain Lawrie would be prepared to let him fly an aeroplane the next day if this was the case.
43. We find as a matter of fact that what was said was that whilst the disciplinary process continued, and it should be borne in mind that at the meeting he had already notified his intention to appeal, it would not be appropriate for Captain Leslie to fly
44. It was apparently standard practice for a pilot to be taken off programme during disciplinary action of any description. The fact was, therefore, that he would not be flying in any event as an appeal was continuing. It was dear at the meeting that Captain Leslie did not accept the written warning. Captain Lawrie expected Captain Leslie to fly the next day despite his appeal being notified that day. We accept what the applicant, Captain Leslie and Captain Clarke said that Captain Leslie did not use the word “stress” in such circumstances. We accept their version of events that Captains who are pilots would not use an expression like that in such circumstances. We. accept that British Midland did give a
Case No: 2600427/0 1
warning to Captain Leslie for the way he had raised his immediate concerns, in other words, not with the Flight Operations Manager and also by making communications to the “One List.” The tone and content of the “One List” communications were also reasons for that warning.
45. The appeal letter of 29 September 2000 was amended as to addressee only on 1 October 2000. in that letter Captain Leslie points out the procedural errors on British Midlands part and points out That he is entitled to two stages of appeal against the decision. He asserts that the procedures did not require him to give any grounds for his appeal but simply to give notice of it.
46. By 9 October 2000 a letter was sent to Captain Leslie saying that the appeal would be dealt with by Captain lain Cullen.
47. By a letter of 13 October 2000 Captain Leslie was notified of the hearing to take place on 18 October 2000 and was advised of his right to have a colleague accompany him at the meeting.
48. By an e-mail of 13 October 2000 Captain Leslie pointed out that he was entitled to more than one appeal hearing. This was accepted by Captain Cullen. Captain Cullen heard the first appeal, therefore, on 18 October 2000. The meeting was attended by Captain Cullen, Captain Clarke, Captain Leslie and Ms Mathewman. Captain Leslie produced a document for the appeal and was able to make additional comments. He sets out his grounds of appeal in detail and his version of the facts in an orderly manner.
49. At the end of the meeting Captain Leslie was advised that matters would be considered further and a letter would be sent to him advising him of the result. Captain Leslie is recorded as saying he felt that he was a safety risk as his mind ‘was elsewhere. This was the reason he had not flown. He and Captain Clarke agreed it was sensible not to fly and Captain Cullen concurred with this. Captain Clarke had no hesitation in expressing his view that he would have no reluctance in flying with Captain Leslie at any point of the process provided that he had a period of rest immediately after the meetings. He said that after a rest to the next day there would be no problem in flying with Captain Leslie as a pilot. There was clearly no decision, in our view, by Captain Cullen to stop Captain Leslie flying. Consensus was reached by three pilots who were in the best position to know. Captain Cullen never raised any question of him being too stressed to fly. All that was expressed was a perception of his anger and frustration during the meetings. We do not think that this was anything above and beyond what might be expected in all the circumstances.
50. On 19 October 2000 Captain Leslie went for a routine medical with the CAA approved doctor to confirm his continuing fitness to fly, He was passed as fit to continue flying, his next medical examinations were then due in April and July2001