Lonewolf is absolutely correct in pointing out the fallacy of adding yet more bells and whistles to a cockpit where bells and whistles are already sounding.
The radalt problem really has only one involvement in this accident - it is not normally 'in scan' on the sort of approach being flown there and thus not noticing the 'invalid' indication is quite understandable. Its involvement was the 'secondary effect' of commanding throttles closed. An a/c with a defunct radalt is so easily flyable, safely and efficiently.
The focus on preventing this accident from recurring is, in my opinion, to focus on training and the quality of the training personnel and system. The Dutch may not say it but as I see it the TC failed badly in his duties and that is where 'repair' is needed. I suggest forgetting about software and automatic systems and concentrating on the 'pink bits' is the priority.
We need to address also the point of having a 'safety pilot' on the flight deck - was he there merely to satisfy a regulatory requirement or was the 'C(ockpit)RM' being properly addressed?