At long last we now have a detailed account of how it happened. If we are asked to explain to laymen who will need to have a very simple and short answer then all I think I can say is pilot error. However the interesting aspect of the report is to be found in Appendix B , the respones of the interested parties. This is where the future battle ground lies, where ATC says there was nothing unusual about a short intercept above the glide, THY says the crew did it all by the book and they did not need to know about rad-alt glitches and the manufacturers say the crew should have known better how to engage the AFS.
I am of the opinion that the Dutch have acted admirably in publishing the full text of these so called responses. No one can now blame them of any undue influence.
The part I think is best descriptive of the whole sad affair is the THY response :
“At Turkish Airlines, the automatic flight system is used as much as possible.”
“to reduce workload, enhance flight safety, situational awareness and fuel economy” should
be added to the end of this sentence to avoid any negative connotations
There seems to be a increase in the trend of air accidents involving automation, which raises questions as to the validity of the claim of enhancing flight safety through reduction of work load. It therefore raises the question whether the another gain in automation is more cost savings through increase in what otherwise would be a reduction in crew duty hours. The old saying is hard work never killed anybody. For situational awareness see the MD83 ATLAS JET Isparta crash.