Bad Airmanship

[Northbeach]

Tiger 66 Malasian ATC's fault - I don't buy it for a second.

Dave Clark Fife.

I take issue with this statement of yours: “The probable cause was the non-standard phraseology was used by Kuala Lumpur ATC, causing the crew to misinterpret the instructions”. I followed your link; and don’t believe what Wikipedia and the Aviation Safety Network have the final say on cause. It would be similar to saying the KLM-Pan Am Tenerife accident was caused by “antiquated tower/ATC equipment”. Well yes there is an element of truth in that statement, but to walk away believing ATC was the only cause is to miss much of what that accident can teach the aviation community.

Tiger 66 taught me to pay attention to the NOTAMS and the paperwork. The ILS was NOTAMED out of service. The captain and crew set up and briefed (poorly) an ILS that was not available to them and never was.

When Malasian ATC corrects them that the approach in use is an NDB approach not the ILS they have some non-complimentary comments regarding the ATC specialist’s family origins. Being an U.S. citizen I find myself as patriotic, flag waving and pro-American as most. However pinning Tiger 66’s demise on Malasian ATC offends my even greater commitment to the “truth”.

It’s not the Malasian ATC controller’s fault that English uses “To”, “Too”, and “Two”. The clearance was to descend to 2400; the captain and FO responded descend “to” 400. So yes there are some phraseology problems. Notice the FAA changed the read back/hear correctly rule about two years ago. Now if you misunderstand and read back the incorrect clearance, and ATC does not catch your error, the fault lies with the pilots (not ATC).

And then there is the little matter of descending down to 400’ to intercept. You and I know an ILS will take you down to about 200’. What non-precision NDB approach in SE Asia would you intercept at 400’? Further, whose responsibility is it to have situational awareness concerning airport elevation, and surrounding terrain when you are running around the clouds close to the ground in a Boeing 747? I would be looking at the people in the left and right front seat (and on the panel). 400’ AGL for an intercept to a non-precision NDB approach does not pass the “reasonability” test! Most/many MDA’s on NDB approaches are above 400’. If memory serves me correctly they crashed into a 600’ +/- hill a few miles short of the runway. Using a 3:1 ratio if you are at 600’ (about where they died) you should be somewhere around 1.8 NM from the airport – they were so far out of those parameters it should have made the hair on the back of their necks stand out. In fact it did.

Listen/read what the FO is saying during the time leading up to this accident. He is extremely uncomfortable with how the flight is progressing. He is hinting/questioning clearances and is out of his comfort zone. The Captain doesn’t seem to really care and seems to ignore his partner’s obvious discomfort.

And then there is the matter of the ground proximity alerter issuing warnings. Warnings ignored. “Wait we are at 200’ RA” (words to that affect) !!@$%##!!! – Bang and it is over. I think the wreckage burned for 2 or more days.

FlightSafety has a good analysis of this accident. I have spent many hours going over the material for my own education. This accident taught me to read and understand the NOTAMS, pay attention to my crew members and the importance of keeping situational awareness. Unfortunately none of those are anything new in aviation. In this case 4 people died in the jet. To infer that they died because an Malasian ATC specialist used non-standard phraseology is to miss the vastly more important lessons that cry to be learned from this accident. And I don’t care what Wikipedia says.