hetfield, we hear you.
But just consider that for any one of the reasons in previous posts the crew were not able to simply fly the plane, or at least not in the manner which you appear to assume.
This ‘inability’ is a combination of human behaviour and the situation in which the crew might find themselves. Change either one or both, then errors and mistakes might be avoided. Humans are difficult to change, and if as in this instance there few or any existing attributes to change, then change may not be an option; thus change the situation.
Arguably the training captain should have foreseen the risks and planned accordingly, so too his management, ATC, the regulators, and at the root of all this the manufacturer who’s design could have avoided the particular circumstances.
Given the choice I would seek a design change as this is a critical contribution at the point of the crew / system interface. Conservative autothrust logic could reject a single failure, and with a dual system disengage the autos, further encouraging the crew to fly the aircraft – to change their plan. In addition, appropriate autothrust logic would mitigate any error in selecting TOGA; compare this with other types.
Yes we should simply fly the aircraft, but flying is not simple; we have to think about it and that requires knowledge, knowhow, and a situation / system which tolerates error.