hetlfield;
"Simply fly the plane."
Yup. The thread could have (and should have) begun and ended right there.
safetypee;
Operators shouldn’t schedule training at busy international destinations, but without this how do new pilots learn; simulation is far from perfect in operational scenarios, or gaining the experience after qualification in line operations would unfairly pressure line captains with a ‘training’ task – again a risk to safety.
Apropos simulation, agree. However, we have seen this important aspect of training come under economic and therefore scheduling pressure as well.
Simulator sessions are reduced from 4hrs to 3.5hrs and AQP approaches reduce the footprint from 4 sessions per year, (
typically taken twice, 1rst day "practise", second day, PPC/IFR) to once every eight months for example. Also, there is a drifting towards an emphasis on documentation rather than on actual outcomes. With LOFT exercises, valuable sim/crew/instructor time is spent waiting for scenarios to unfold in real time. Advocating a return to "new day, new airplane" is not the key either. We have all experienced those sessions which were so heavily scripted with abnormals that learning and practise is compromised, but with new approaches which emphasize thinking (within the AOM) rather than swift iterations of QRH memory items, valuable time is lost in various phases of flight waiting for the next waypoint, etc. It is indeed a compromise.
It is accepted that the purpose of training is to render the unfamiliar, familiar, first to extinguish "surprise" and then to build habits of thinking as per the AOM guidance material, company Ops Manuals and the regs. I agree with your comments on training on the line in regular operations. It is a marginal approach to training which line-operations training captains "make work" because they must but which in truth is very much a compromise in many ways. All training captains have their stories, myself included, which illustrate these points admirably but which, sadly, do not have the necessary impact upon the decision-makers at the airline and within the regulatory authority to bring the issues to a head and cause change. "Kicking tin" remains the primary driver, thus the problems never go away, they just remain dormant until the holes line up once again.
Because historical (1950 - 1970), primary causes of accidents such as altitude awarenes, mid-air collision, navigation error, weather (no/poor radar, windshear), ATC capabilities, mechanical (engine or system) failure, system and instrumentation design (ergonomics) and others have largely been resolved (and the accident rate shows it), the emerging record of accident causation now demonstrates emminent preventability through training and comprehension of human factors. And Human Factors, it must be admitted, extend far beyond the cockpit and is a systematic matter, not a "pilot" matter.
A realistic approach to fares is way overdue. The reason the flying public will aggressively shop for a $10 saving on fares is because the airlines have taught them to do so. Airlines have patronized cheapness by devaluing their product, devaluing the contributions of trained, dedicated employees, magically believing that the principles of flight safety can be done on a quarterly report basis. It cannot.
The astonishing thing about such nickel-and-diming is, that same public will stand in long lines at Starbucks to pay that same ten bucks for two designer coffees.
That is a perception issue, not a marketing issue. Airlines may squeeze fares and wages alike so that investors and CEOs, not safety, come first, but they also squeeze because they don't (and given the expectation handed out during deregulation, can't) take in enough money to pay the bills.
Given that nobody manages by walking around the shop floor anymore, it is a short hop to a shoestring mentality, justified because "nothing happens" and when it does, the full picture of why is never in view, just the picture of the guys or gals at the pointy end.
The present accident record is exceptional notwithstanding the tremendous human suffering which lies behind even one airline fatality let alone the 600+ passengers who lost their lives in 2009. But because new leaders coming into the industry don't seem to know the history of how the industry's safety record got that way, are taking it for granted that safety is somehow magically engineered into the airplanes and "the system" and isn't related to (expensive) programs, (time-consuming) processes and (expensive) specialist resources.
If there is reward to be had in change and positing solutions, I think it may lie along the lines that the thinking and production processes described above must change, and when it does all else will follow because it can be both philosophically legitimated and therefore economically justified.