I think this accident raises interesting questions, looking at the man-machine interface... "Why did the throttle retract after a manual override?" is one of them.
At least it retracted, in an airbus it wouldn't. Look at the Sao Paulo accident where the crew didn't notice that one engine was in TOGA while the other was in reverse... Certainly a lot to say about human/machine interface.
BOAC, while it's logic that the levers moved back to idle, it is questionable to decide whether or not the AT should prevail following contradictory manual inputs.
Wiz, I'm not judging the crews of both BA & Turkish. Of course BA guys obtained excellent results and didn't make any fault leading to the accident, while the Turkish crew actively created the context of their accident. The point I'm trying to make isn't there. I'm looking at the situational awareness and the acceptance of an unusual situations by the crews, leading to rapid decisions. The BA and Turkish guys didn't have much time to understand and accept their situation in order to act accordingly and basically they took the actions which seemed to be the most appropriate. In the Turkish case, applying full thrust in their configuration sealed their fate while BA038 achieved a safe landing despite their flight profile.