I accuse the Turkish crew of nothing more than exactly what you ascribe to them above.
Accepting an unstable approach, continuing with a Vs that meant speed did not stabilize, not noticing that the speed bled back below Vref whilst the thrust stayed at idle and allowing the aircraft to trim full nose up are all included above and are actions by or omissions from the crew.
I also do not anoint the BA Crew with the Hero tag. I think that, dealing with a MAJOR malfunction, they did a perfectly reasonable job and got a very nearly optimum outcome. I doubt that a nicely flared landing on the piano keys was possible under any circumstances, so zero fatalities is a pretty good result.
Yes, the Turkish guys were at the end of a chain of events, not all of their making, but the fact remains that the aircraft was serviceable apart from a minor glitch, the dealing with of which is what we're paid for.
SFLY, I'm actually sympathetic to wards the Turkish crew. They made some fundamental errors, but there but for the grace of God....
What got me involved in this thread and is earning you so much rancor is your attempt to equate them with the 38 crew. They did not make ANY errors in their handling of the situation. They were not (and neither am I or you) trained to get the optimum gliding performance out of the aircraft (which, by the way, would have been impossible to know, as the presence of residual thrust would have changed the required speed.) and did a good job with the little time and knowledge available too them.
We ARE trained not to let a simple automatic glitch end in an accident.
We should certainly look deeper into training, culture, complacency and over-reliance on automatics to try and find and correct the root cause of the problem and hey, maybe giving us an AofA meter and information on how best to use it would benefit the next crew who find themselves gliding a jet.
Your support of the Turkish guys is admirable. Your attempt to say they were no more in error then the BA38 crew is misguided.