What strikes me in this report is that the crew had to conduct a GS interception from above with excessive speed in IMC (interception from above at 1330' with 169 kts). There is a major ATC factor in my opinion. Following that interception the crew obviously monitored speed as low as 770' since 144 kts was selected during the deceleration. While the crew expected the AT to adjust speed kept decreasing until stick shaker, which occurred 310' lower. This didn't give them much time to realize the AT wasn't working properly and this is far from the 2000' of unmonitored speed commented by "professionals" who obviously didn't even read the report. As the stick shaker was activated the crew applied full thrust manually (which came back to idle), disconnected the AP and pitched down. Realizing the levers went back to idle the captain re-adjusted the thrust to the maximum and the aircraft entered an uncontrolled pitch up movement leading to the final stall. In any case they crashed without using fully serviceable engines, they crashed with engines at full power which basically caused the stall due to the extreme pitch up trim position. Engines were set to full power for the last 300 feet, it wasn't a matter of a basic go around. If the BA guys had recovered full thrust after stick shaker activation they would also have enjoyed a roller coaster trip.
They didn't HAVE to intercept glids slope from above, nor continue with the approach. They could and almost certainly should have initiated a go-around well before things got to that stage.
I can't speak for Turkish, but what you describe would constitute an unstable approach by any SOPS I've operated to, and a go-around would have been manditory from 1000ft. If nothing else, all SOPs I've operated to mandate thrust not be at idle by 1000'- clearly not the case here.
You make much of the fact that they set 144kts at 770 ft. Firstly, the need to be changing the bug at that height means the approach was unstable. Secondly, at that or any height the anticipated thrust increase should have been manually backed up and over-riden if it did NOT increase as expected (Interestingly, I'm just thinking back to My F/Os approach into DXB not two hous ago. With a FUINCTIONAL a/t system, he still needed to manually adjust thrust during a bumpy approach as the A/t wasn't reacting fast enough.)
If they did indeed have the SA to be expecting a thrust increase as the approach stabilised, they should have had the CRM to adjust for it when it didn't.
As to the attempted recovery, firstly approach to stall mandates disconnection of the A/t.Secondly, once applying max thrust, your hand should not come off the T/Ls until you are in a safe flight condition.