What total b@llocks this thread has descended into. By all means compare the Turkish "accident" with the Thomson "incident" @ BOH. The only differences there were the mechanism by which the A/T did not function as expected, the lack of worsening of the situation by the A/T mishandling after the stall,& the height avail for recovery.
Again, how thick do you have to be , to see clearly, that the BA crew were trying to resolve a major malfunction, whilst maintaining a reasonable approach path. The Turkish crew created their own situation by totally failing to monitor the basic parameters of an effectively servicable aircraft.
The BA Capt used all the resources (the F/O ) whilst he tried to resolve the situation, and yes , the F/O used the AP to fly the LOC/GS. Arguably it may theoretically have been better to abandon the glidepath and fly faster until a bit later in the approach , before adopting energy re-utilisation, but that goes against all the training and habits we develop and are tested on, which is to maintain the glide path. Furthermore they had , in all likelihood, never received training in this situation, are you trying to tell me the Turkish crew were never trained to monitor airspeed during an approach ? DUH ! !
I cannot think of 100 ways to phrase this, what do you find so difficult to understand.
1 crew were faced with an untrained for emergency, very late on the approach, and indeed , bearing in mind the previous comments about the energy avail between best L/D and stall, to MAYBE make the Runway at any cost ,perhaps sacrificing a smooth touchdown, in preference to a touchdown in the airport environs at least, was perhaps the only thing they were concentrating on, and perhaps the only thing realistically they could do.
This they did, what were the Turkish crew concentrating on during their approach, with both engines responding normally if only asked ?
Counting the tulips in the fields ? or what ?
To recap, 1 crew found themselves in a high AoA situation close to the ground courtesy of the worst malfunction possible at that stage of flight, and did what they felt best, to utilise the energy they had to make the airport, at least, it worked.
Crew 2 (for reasons that we don't know, and may even be understandable up to a point, although somehow I think this will be stretching the point) put themselves in a similar situation a bit higher off the ground. . . I repeat PUT THEMSELVES IN A SIMILAR SITUATION.
Do you see the difference yet ?
To answer your totally outrageous and impertinent question, why are one crew heroes and the other being portrayed as zeroes ?
1 crew did the best any of us could have probably achieved, following a totally unrehearsed major emergency at low altitude.
The other crew somehow contrived to CREATE a similar situation all on their own, which they sadly failed to recover from, and paid the ultimate price for, as is sometimes the case in this profession we choose.
DO YOU FINALLY GET IT ?