SFLY,
That is actually not an entirely unreasnoble post, but I still have differences from you.
I still dispute that there was anything the BA crew could have done that might have led to a better result. I have in fact been led to believe that, had they taken flap20 instead of Flap 25, they may have made the runway. This would have actually been worse as the impact would have been on tarmac instead of grass.
There was certainly no deviation from what they were trained to do, as they had never been trained to handle this situation. Is it possible that a more optimum flightpath was possible? Almost certainly. Is it reasnoble to expect them to achieve it under the cirumstances? Certainly not.
The Turkish case was different. It is basic CRM that one pilot is always exclusivley charged with monitoring the flight parameters of the aircraft, and in critical stages of flight the OTHER sholid be monitoring HIM. If an Automatic system does not do as expected, and imediate downgrade or dis-connect should be made. This was a case when it is clear the crew did not perform their most basic task- flying the aeroplane- to a satisfactory level.
You talk about mechanisms. If we are in an era where allowing airspeed to reduce to stall because of total relience on an automated system is excusable, then we indeed have a systemic problem.
Who knows if at some point these Turkish guys thought they were experiencing a similar situation as in the BA's case?
Are you really saying they might have mistaken idle thrust with the T/Ls AT idle for a double engine failure?
It's nice to remind that the Turkish crew had fully serviceable engines which probably contributed to its fate. What would have been the 777's trajectory should it have recovered full thrust just after stick shaker activation and in IMC?
For either the 737 or the 777, that should have resulted in a climb and a safe go-around. Approach to satll is something we DO train for.