Wiz, you initially tell us that to fly a glider as far as possible you first need to fly at best glide speed then to use the extra energy by increasing the AOA in order to stretch the glide in a way that (optimally) the minimum speed (stall) coincides with the landing.
In BA's case they never maintained a reasonable gliding speed in order to optimize perfs before a flare but kept it constantly decreasing until they almost stall. Secondly, instead of flying an optimized path, they kept flying the GS which leads a thousand feet beyond threshold, at cost of precious speed and for no benefit at all.
It's nice to remind that the Turkish crew had fully serviceable engines which probably contributed to its fate. What would have been the 777's trajectory should it have recovered full thrust just after stick shaker activation and in IMC?
Since you still didn't get it, let me say it again: I don't care to know who was right or wrong, I have no idea if I would have done better than the BA or even the Turkish guys. That's basically not the point and I'm much more interested in the mechanisms that leads to some actions that to judging these actions.
A lot of people agrees on the fact that the BA guys' professionalism shouldn't be discussed while they are very prompt to judge the Turkish pilots. I find it little bit unfair, especially when in my opinion the BA guys didn't perform any miracle by wasting energy on the glide slope. They basically started to act on the controls when no energy was left.
Someone made an excellent comment on the fact that both crews couldn't act in an appropriate manner without recognizing and accepting their respective situations. Understanding what contributes to delay the acceptance of the situation is probably the most important issue in both accidents.
Who knows if at some point these Turkish guys thought they were experiencing a similar situation as in the BA's case?