It comes as no suprise that the lack of joined-up airworthiness implementation is not solely confined to the Nimrod - that is the unwritten basic message of the H-C Report and why his recommendations are so massively 'across the piste'.
Similar failings in airworthiness implementation can be easily seen in the case of the Sea King HISL but also, in Hercules ESF, Tornado IFF, Chinook (HC2 RTS, FADEC and HC3 procurement) and possibly even in the lack of Puma anticipators (made worse by reducing the opportunities for crew-training).
What really worries me is that, for sure, there are many other slices of cheese with gaping holes that are waiting to undermine the safety the ac that our crews are flying today (perhaps some of the crews will be blissfully unaware).
Which is why the H-C recommendations must be implemented PDQ. Perhaps the MoD should go even further ...but what chance of that?
But if you know of a hole in your particular slice of cheese - then point it out, in writing, to your chain of command and copy the FS chain -now!
Failure to address these holes in the cheese is only doing the enemy's job for him.
Good Luck AM Ness Sir!