Military Airworthiness
Thread Starter
Military Airworthiness
Some of the major military airworthiness protagonists on various threads here will already know this, but other PPRuNErs might also be interested in BBC Radio’s ‘File on 4’ this Tuesday at 2000.
BBC - BBC Radio 4 Programmes - File on 4, 14/07/2009
Although that trailer focusses on Nimrod, the programme also deals in a more general way with such things as Hercules ESF, the conduct of BsoI, and the human rights of the people involved.
Each ‘File on 4’ is a 38-minute single subject documentary, and its investigative journalism won it a Sony Radio Award last year. The judges described it as “current affairs documentary-making at its best”. So it’s something of a coup to have got this thorny subject onto the programme’s schedule. The reporter is the admirable Angus Stickler, who normally works for ‘Today’ - and it’s likely that his story will have sufficient punch to make it onto ’Today’ tomorrow morning as well. I don’t know what time that’ll be, but Today runs from 0600 to 0900 on Radio 4. If I get more on that I’ll post it.
If you miss the 2000 programme, it’s repeated on Sunday at 1700, and you will of course be able to get it on BBC iPlayer.
airsound
BBC - BBC Radio 4 Programmes - File on 4, 14/07/2009
Although that trailer focusses on Nimrod, the programme also deals in a more general way with such things as Hercules ESF, the conduct of BsoI, and the human rights of the people involved.
Each ‘File on 4’ is a 38-minute single subject documentary, and its investigative journalism won it a Sony Radio Award last year. The judges described it as “current affairs documentary-making at its best”. So it’s something of a coup to have got this thorny subject onto the programme’s schedule. The reporter is the admirable Angus Stickler, who normally works for ‘Today’ - and it’s likely that his story will have sufficient punch to make it onto ’Today’ tomorrow morning as well. I don’t know what time that’ll be, but Today runs from 0600 to 0900 on Radio 4. If I get more on that I’ll post it.
If you miss the 2000 programme, it’s repeated on Sunday at 1700, and you will of course be able to get it on BBC iPlayer.
airsound
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BBC NEWS | UK | MoD 'ignored' air safety warnings
However Air Vice Marshall Hillier said: "It wasn't a question of not knowing there was the ability to fit explosive suppression foam, it was a question of prioritisation.
"The way we were using the C130 [Hercules] was not in the way the US was using the aircraft in Vietnam - our assessment of the threats was that this was not the highest priority."
I heard the taster of the File on 4 program on the Today program and dear oh dear, the MoD and RAF are still trotting out the same old trite lines. It begs the question, what was the highest priority, installing comfortable chairs in the puzzle palace? Is Hillier basing his answer on the information given to him by his advisers or is there a basic lack of understanding on his part. ESF actually stands for Explosion Suppressant Foam, the foam itself isn't explosive.
AVM Hillier is either out of touch and should resign or he is plain lying and should resign.
He stated that the role of (tactical) C130 Hercules meant it didn't need foam protection prior to the shooting down of XV179. (Completely ignoring the two recommends in 2002 and 2003). The TAT report made its recommendations to urgently fit foam based on the ROLE of the C130 Hercules in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two separate reports, two different theatres coming to the same conclusion that there was a real risk that Hercules would be shot down without fuel tank protection. Need I remind AVM Hillier that this was a Special Forces Hercules that was shot down in 2005 flying at operational low level exposed to all manner of ground fire? Should I remind AVM Hillier that Special Forces crews had been flying ultra low over Iraq since 2003. Should I remind Hillier that a Special Forces Hercules had been holed in the fuel tank 6 months before, luckily, on that occasion, the fuel tank was full of fuel and the bullet failed to ignite the vapours.
Many reports of ground fire on RAF Hercules had been filed in the early phases of the Afghan War in 2001/2002. Including several from myself.
The official RAF website states clearly that throughout the 1990s RAF Hercules sustained ground fire in the Sarajevo airlift, Special Forces crews were shot at on frequent occasions.
The danger and enhanced level of risk is implicit on Special Forces missions. It appears that AVM Hillier is obviously not aware of the global role of Special Forces crews on RAF tactical transport aircraft.
It beggars belief that a senior RAF officer should pretend that Hercules were not at risk from being shot down from ground fire before XV179.
His answers were a disgrace to his uniform and the men who have lost their lives in the RAF. This is merely a cack handed attempt to avoid responsibility. I suggest the first thing Hillier does this morning is to pull out the secret TAT reports of 2002 and 2003 and familiarize himself with the urgent requests to fit ESF which were ignored and which he condoned.
However Air Vice Marshall Hillier said: "It wasn't a question of not knowing there was the ability to fit explosive suppression foam, it was a question of prioritisation.
"The way we were using the C130 [Hercules] was not in the way the US was using the aircraft in Vietnam - our assessment of the threats was that this was not the highest priority."
I heard the taster of the File on 4 program on the Today program and dear oh dear, the MoD and RAF are still trotting out the same old trite lines. It begs the question, what was the highest priority, installing comfortable chairs in the puzzle palace? Is Hillier basing his answer on the information given to him by his advisers or is there a basic lack of understanding on his part. ESF actually stands for Explosion Suppressant Foam, the foam itself isn't explosive.
AVM Hillier is either out of touch and should resign or he is plain lying and should resign.
He stated that the role of (tactical) C130 Hercules meant it didn't need foam protection prior to the shooting down of XV179. (Completely ignoring the two recommends in 2002 and 2003). The TAT report made its recommendations to urgently fit foam based on the ROLE of the C130 Hercules in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two separate reports, two different theatres coming to the same conclusion that there was a real risk that Hercules would be shot down without fuel tank protection. Need I remind AVM Hillier that this was a Special Forces Hercules that was shot down in 2005 flying at operational low level exposed to all manner of ground fire? Should I remind AVM Hillier that Special Forces crews had been flying ultra low over Iraq since 2003. Should I remind Hillier that a Special Forces Hercules had been holed in the fuel tank 6 months before, luckily, on that occasion, the fuel tank was full of fuel and the bullet failed to ignite the vapours.
Many reports of ground fire on RAF Hercules had been filed in the early phases of the Afghan War in 2001/2002. Including several from myself.
The official RAF website states clearly that throughout the 1990s RAF Hercules sustained ground fire in the Sarajevo airlift, Special Forces crews were shot at on frequent occasions.
The danger and enhanced level of risk is implicit on Special Forces missions. It appears that AVM Hillier is obviously not aware of the global role of Special Forces crews on RAF tactical transport aircraft.
It beggars belief that a senior RAF officer should pretend that Hercules were not at risk from being shot down from ground fire before XV179.
His answers were a disgrace to his uniform and the men who have lost their lives in the RAF. This is merely a cack handed attempt to avoid responsibility. I suggest the first thing Hillier does this morning is to pull out the secret TAT reports of 2002 and 2003 and familiarize himself with the urgent requests to fit ESF which were ignored and which he condoned.
Last edited by nigegilb; 14th Jul 2009 at 09:40.
Thread Starter
The 'Today' piece eventually appeared at 0848, and lasted about 5mins. If you want to hear it go to
BBC iPlayer Console
and scroll through to time 024800 (2hrs 48 mins into programme)
airsound
BBC iPlayer Console
and scroll through to time 024800 (2hrs 48 mins into programme)
airsound
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't even think Hillier understands basic airworthiness concepts. The Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) reports of 2002 and 2003 were effectively vulnerability analysis reports required because aircraft were being deployed into a new theatre. A threat assessment needed to be carried out because each theatre poses different threats. The two reports quite rightly recognised the threat from small arms to Hercules wing fuel tanks because the ROLE of the Hercules exposed them to such a threat. The RAF sat on the reports and did not disseminate them to the Sqns where tactics could have been changed whilst a foam program was put in place. The reports outlined the stark risk and the consequences of fuel tank explosion.
I am utterly at a loss as to how Hillier can still suggest AFTER the conclusion of the Inquest and the public knowledge of the existence of these reports that the RAF somehow didn't think the role of the Hercules necessitated foam.
It was an explicit and urgent recommendation. Is Hillier his own man, or is he only prepared to read a script waived under his nose by a PR "adviser"?
I am utterly at a loss as to how Hillier can still suggest AFTER the conclusion of the Inquest and the public knowledge of the existence of these reports that the RAF somehow didn't think the role of the Hercules necessitated foam.
It was an explicit and urgent recommendation. Is Hillier his own man, or is he only prepared to read a script waived under his nose by a PR "adviser"?
our assessment of the threats was that this was not the highest priority
Last edited by BlackIsle; 14th Jul 2009 at 19:18. Reason: error in quote!
I'm not sure this programme was really about airworthiness rather it was highlighting of the avoidance of costs, at all cost, over the last 20 years or so.
The fact is there is no real "military airworthiness system" because no-one can argue with MOD/IPT decisions not to do anything - until just after it has been proven to be an incorrect decision.
That is not "airworthiness" but "litigation reaction maintenance".
Rigga
The fact is there is no real "military airworthiness system" because no-one can argue with MOD/IPT decisions not to do anything - until just after it has been proven to be an incorrect decision.
That is not "airworthiness" but "litigation reaction maintenance".
Rigga
Join Date: Feb 2004
Location: uk
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
AVM H's stupified silence to an articulate and researched question spoke volumes about his ignorance (or worse still his arrogance) concerning the lives of those he supposed to exercise care over.
Perhaps people of his rank are so used to being surrounded by careerist sycophants that they flounder in face of naked truth!
Excellent investigative journalism , I take back everything I have ever said about the BBC.
Perhaps people of his rank are so used to being surrounded by careerist sycophants that they flounder in face of naked truth!
Excellent investigative journalism , I take back everything I have ever said about the BBC.
Rigga:
Whatever the reason(s), Rigga, Hercules, Nimrod, Sea King, Chinook Mk2 (?) suggest that you are indeed right. 60 deaths if you include Mull. 60 needless deaths in 5 avoidable crashes. UK Military Airworthiness desperately needs to be wrested from the MOD and placed in a separate and independent MAA. Similarly the woeful record of RAF/RN BoIs in not discovering why these aircraft crashed and what must be done to avoid recurrences means that Accident Investigation should be placed with a separate and independent MAAIB. Only when all this is done can we slowly claw our way back to a position of avoiding avoidable accidents and properly investigating ones that are not avoided so they in turn may be avoided in future. All that is not to wrap our aircraft, aircrew and pax in cotton wool, but to use them in a military way rather than as being simply lost for that purpose.
Great programme, well done Angus!
The fact is there is no real "military airworthiness system" because no-one can argue with MOD/IPT decisions not to do anything
Great programme, well done Angus!
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK Sometimes
Posts: 1,062
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hillier was poorly briefed and aware and he came over badly. I'm sure he's intelligent enough to spot where he went wrong today and where the RAF went wrong with the Herc and Nimrod in the past - whether he has the courage to argue for a better system will remain to be seen.
Senior staff have always argued that Albert was procured in the 1960s to be operated only in benign environments and so didn't need ESF.
Well, that may be the case but someone at MoD PE/DE&S/IPT should have spotted the huge flaws in this assumption when we started operating Albert in hostile/threat areas - and they knew the answer to the problem (ESF) - its been known about for years in PE and scientific circles.
However, it is arguable when the change to a hostile operating environment happened exactly for Albert. How about the middle-east in the late 1960s? Northern Ireland in the 1970s? Rhodesia in the 1980s (in fact, anywhere in Africa)? Sth Atlantic, GW1, Balkans etc etc - it doesn't matter; these were all way before AFG/IRQ and the vulnerability should have been addressed!
As I have said, we (the sqns) were lulled into a false sense of security for which we must take some responsibilty but some people did see the the problem (going back to the 70s) However, the message never made it to MoD central funding! However, it is PE/DE&S/IPTs who are the ones who have always been charged with this overall airworthiness responsibility and it is they who should have spelt it out more forecfully to the madarins in charge of the purse-strings. Sadly, the airworthiness system is a mere shadow of its former self. 15 -20 years of cuts, reorganisations and continued loss of experience/knowledge (in itself, against the regs) have emasculated the military airworthiness process and I doubt it can ever recover - so perhaps now it is time to take that responsibility away from an already overstretched military system?
What is worse is that this insidious reduction of engineering and design insight has been staring us in the face - a number of accidents have highlighted this but such is the lack of freedom of military accident investigations/BoIs/SIs to reach down (or is that up?) to the the root causes of accidents and pre-disposing organisational failures, that the warning signs have been missed all too often. As a result, responsibility for military accident investigation should also be completely removed from the associated chain of command. Because the military is now so small, that means taken away from the MoD itself.
Where is the next airworthiness failure coming from? Who is assessing the threat and mitigation? Is ALARP sufficient - who defines the probabilty and the level of risk? Food for thought?
Flipster
Senior staff have always argued that Albert was procured in the 1960s to be operated only in benign environments and so didn't need ESF.
Well, that may be the case but someone at MoD PE/DE&S/IPT should have spotted the huge flaws in this assumption when we started operating Albert in hostile/threat areas - and they knew the answer to the problem (ESF) - its been known about for years in PE and scientific circles.
However, it is arguable when the change to a hostile operating environment happened exactly for Albert. How about the middle-east in the late 1960s? Northern Ireland in the 1970s? Rhodesia in the 1980s (in fact, anywhere in Africa)? Sth Atlantic, GW1, Balkans etc etc - it doesn't matter; these were all way before AFG/IRQ and the vulnerability should have been addressed!
As I have said, we (the sqns) were lulled into a false sense of security for which we must take some responsibilty but some people did see the the problem (going back to the 70s) However, the message never made it to MoD central funding! However, it is PE/DE&S/IPTs who are the ones who have always been charged with this overall airworthiness responsibility and it is they who should have spelt it out more forecfully to the madarins in charge of the purse-strings. Sadly, the airworthiness system is a mere shadow of its former self. 15 -20 years of cuts, reorganisations and continued loss of experience/knowledge (in itself, against the regs) have emasculated the military airworthiness process and I doubt it can ever recover - so perhaps now it is time to take that responsibility away from an already overstretched military system?
What is worse is that this insidious reduction of engineering and design insight has been staring us in the face - a number of accidents have highlighted this but such is the lack of freedom of military accident investigations/BoIs/SIs to reach down (or is that up?) to the the root causes of accidents and pre-disposing organisational failures, that the warning signs have been missed all too often. As a result, responsibility for military accident investigation should also be completely removed from the associated chain of command. Because the military is now so small, that means taken away from the MoD itself.
Where is the next airworthiness failure coming from? Who is assessing the threat and mitigation? Is ALARP sufficient - who defines the probabilty and the level of risk? Food for thought?
Flipster
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
He didn't appear to have a clue. A case in point for taking airworthiness decision making from the chain of command. If you are going to be interviewed by a s**t hot Today reporter, a flagship news program listened to by HMQ, PM and on, you make sure your ducks are in a row.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From last nights File on 4
Absolutely disgraceful
Tappers Mother
What the loss of the Nimrod has tragically demonstrated is that there were shortcomings in our understanding of the airworthiness of that platform
Air Vice Marshall Stephen Hillier
Air Vice Marshall Stephen Hillier
Tappers Mother
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: South West
Age: 73
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Of note, during the work up and participation in the Falklands campaign, We requested that mesh (in those days) or foam be retro fitted to the fuel tanks for the Alberts directly involved in theatre.
Answer, why would an unarmed transporter in the firing line need fuel tank fire suppressant? Surely, only "combat" aircraft need that sort of thing"!
Obviously nothing ever changes!
Answer, why would an unarmed transporter in the firing line need fuel tank fire suppressant? Surely, only "combat" aircraft need that sort of thing"!
Obviously nothing ever changes!
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes that line was tried at the Inquest, with regard to DefStans which refer to fuel tank explosions and combat aircraft. We pointed out that the air transport section was omitted entirely.
Incidentally the evidence given by a C130 pilot at the time of Falklands War indicated that foam was indeed requested but not enough time was deemed available before onset of hostilities. The boys didn't give up, they requested foam again after the war, but this time they were told the Falklands was a one off and they wouldn't need foam again in the future.
Funny, last time I checked 47 Sqn was the most highly decorated Sqn in the RAF in recent years, could well be 7 Sqn now, but they were always provided with adequate protection.
No, don't bother asking Hillier......
Incidentally the evidence given by a C130 pilot at the time of Falklands War indicated that foam was indeed requested but not enough time was deemed available before onset of hostilities. The boys didn't give up, they requested foam again after the war, but this time they were told the Falklands was a one off and they wouldn't need foam again in the future.
Funny, last time I checked 47 Sqn was the most highly decorated Sqn in the RAF in recent years, could well be 7 Sqn now, but they were always provided with adequate protection.
No, don't bother asking Hillier......
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: Bristol Temple Meads
Posts: 869
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thread Starter
'Today' continues the debate with new revelations
The admirable Angus Stickler has just taken the Military Airworthiness argument a stage further on 'Today' on Radio 4. He has seen a hitherto unrevealed 22-year-old report from a former head of the AAIB (William Tench) which was commissioned by a defence minister (Lord Trefgarne). The report revealed long-term systemic deficiencies in military air accident investigation, but its major recommendations were shelved.
You'll be able to hear Angus' piece again later today when it appears on the Today website
BBC - Today - Today
airsound
You'll be able to hear Angus' piece again later today when it appears on the Today website
BBC - Today - Today
airsound
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Crossing Charlie
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Heard this piece this morning driving to work.
This is a must for all followers of the Chinook-still hitting back thread
Much stick on the programme of senior officers who had often been the Convening Officers of BoIs trying to bring pressure to bear on those conducting the enquiries to change their findings.
LB
This is a must for all followers of the Chinook-still hitting back thread
Much stick on the programme of senior officers who had often been the Convening Officers of BoIs trying to bring pressure to bear on those conducting the enquiries to change their findings.
LB