Oh right, that would be the Daily Telegraph article that you rubbished, "why any of you would think that Merlin SH crews who, as a part of their normal working routine, operate day in, day out in a threat environment, would baulk at a few RPGs, defeats me."
Nowhere does it mention SeaKing in the article and by confirming the lack of anti RPG armour on Merlin, you are confirming the truth behind the article.
And BTW the MoD published the BoI report on XV179 on the internet, years before modding any of the frames and before I ever uttered a word in public, so don't try and hang that on me.
If you think sending WIMIKS on MSRs to complete helicopter resupply tasks because there are no helicopters to do the job, is a sign of good military planning, then more fool you. The SeaKings are needed because of the terrible risks of IED attack and because of a lack of SH, doesn't mean they are fit for purpose. Or are you saying they are?
"Currently running in Exeter is the inquest on the death of Pte Jack Sadler, which we covered last year, with the inquest proceedings attracting an interim report from The Daily Telegraph.
Jack, a TA volunteer in Honourable Artillery Company, was a Wimik gunner, attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) serving 52 Brigade in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick 7.
On 4 December 2007, the BRF, comprising a group of Wimiks, was scouting a route for an artillery convoy of made up of two Pinzgauers
each pulling a 105mm light gun, plus DROPS trucks carrying the ammunition. They were on their way to a firing point close to Musa Qala to take part in the operation to recover the town.
Making pitifully slow progress over the rough ground, they had been observed by what they feared might have been Taleban "dickers" as they had skirted a village en route before then reaching a "problematic" steep-sided wadi which they had to cross, following a route they had taken the day before – the only one which the trucks could negotiate.
Because of the heavy trucks the Force was escorting, there were only a very limited number of points at which the wadi could be crossed. While scouting the route across, Jack's Wimik hit a mine, with him sustaining fatal injuries.
No mine clearance had been carried out as the convoy was static while the reconnaissance was carried out. It was a "sitting target" and an attack was feared if it remained in one place too long, so the pressure was on to get the convoy moving again. But, on the rocky ground, the Group commander did not suspect any danger. There were no "Combat Indicators" suggesting trouble and no one in the group "sensed" any danger.
Had there been enough helicopters, the two guns and their supplies of ammunition could easily have been transported by air – as underslung loads. This would be an easy job for a Chinook. But, with a major operation in the offing, there was no spare capacity and, therefore, the battery had to travel by road, with fatal results."
There are about 30 deaths attributable to similar circumstances.
I fully understand the concept of fitness for purpose and I am very comfortable in the context in which I have used it. You are the one who appears to be struggling to understand the concept. It is simple, if there is a ballistic threat, it needs to be countered. If it is not countered and there is shown to be a cost effective and straightforward solution, promulgated in DefStans then it is not fit for purpose. I understand the problem in the RW with helo performance and that is where military risk is currently being used, on certain types.
For a more macro look at why I am so critical of military planners here is a bit of bed time reading; (warning there are some long words in here)
http://www.publications.parliament.u...ce/558/558.pdf
All the problems of shortages of men, equipment and support predicted for the 2006 deployment to Afg and ignored. I am comfortable with my description of military planning as gung ho.
59. "Given the importance to the Helmand mission of airlift capability, we note with concern the small number of UK helicopters dedicated to the deployment. We welcome the commitment made by the US and Dutch air forces to supplement the UK airlift. We remain deeply concerned about the ability of the UK’s ten dedicated helicopters to perform the extensive range of roles that will be asked of them, particularly given the demanding environment in which they will operate and the likely attrition rates that
will result."
MoD Response to the above Defence Committee criticism;
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20. As announced by the Secretary of State on 26 January, the HTF will be supported by a total of 18 helicopters: 6 Chinook support helicopters, 4 Lynx light utility helicopters, and 8 Apache attack helicopters.
21. The number of support helicopters deployed on this mission is based on
recommendations made by the relevant military planning staffs and was agreed by Chiefs of Staff earlier this year. The planning figure takes into account the expected flying hours for each aircraft and attrition rates. These planning assumptions will be kept under review.
For an update on the situation, the recently published and devastating FCO report that starkly highlighted the mission creep and lack of clarity of mission purpose. Apologies to everyone for thread creep.
House of Commons - Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan - Foreign Affairs Committee
CHAPTER 6: THE UK'S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
The UK's expanding mission in Afghanistan
29. We conclude that the UK's mission in Afghanistan has taken on a significantly different, and considerably expanded, character since the first British troops were deployed there in 2001. The UK has moved from its initial goal of supporting the US in countering international terrorism, far into the realms of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics, protection of human rights, and state-building. During our visit we were struck by the sheer magnitude of the task confronting the UK. We conclude that there has been significant 'mission creep' in the British deployment to Afghanistan, and that this has resulted in the British government being now committed to a wide range of objectives. We further conclude that in its response to this Report, the Government should set out, in unambiguous terms, its first and most important priority in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 225)
The UK deployment to Helmand
30.
We conclude that the UK deployment to Helmand was undermined by unrealistic planning at senior levels, poor co-ordination between Whitehall departments and crucially, a failure to provide the military with clear direction. We further conclude that as the situation currently stands, the "comprehensive approach" is faltering, largely because the security situation is preventing any strengthening of governance and Afghan capacity. The very clear conclusion that we took from our visit to Helmand is that stabilisation need not be complicated or expensive, but it does require provision of security, good governance, and a belief within the local population that ISAF forces will outlast the insurgents. (Paragraph 236)
The role of, and impact on, the British armed forces
31. We conclude that the Government must ensure that our armed forces are provided with the appropriate resources to undertake the tasks requested of them, particularly in an environment as challenging as Helmand. We further conclude that in spite of well-documented difficulties, British armed forces are now gradually beginning to create and sustain the conditions that make it possible to extend good governance and the rule of law in the most heavily populated areas of Helmand. We conclude that the support provided by additional equipment and by the US 'surge' of troops in Helmand will be of considerable assistance, and is greatly to be welcomed. (Paragraph 248)