Hi all,
from today's news
Report: Air Atlanta Icelandic B742 over Romania on Jul 14th 2007, strong odour in cockpit
Report: Air Atlanta Icelandic B742 over Romania on Jul 14th 2007, strong odour in cockpit
By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Jun 16th 2009 09:16Z, last updated Tuesday, Jun 16th 2009 12:35Z
An Air Atlanta Icelandic Boeing 747-200 freighter on behalf of Malaysia Airlines, registration TF-ATX performing freight flight MH-6151 from Milan Linate (Italy) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates) with 2 passengers and 3 crew, was enroute overhead Romania, when an odour in the cabin appearing shortly after takeoff became so strong, that the passengers complained about the smell. The captain, who was aware the airplane carried some level 9 hazardeous material (hazard to environment) sent the flight engineer to the cargo bay to inspect the cargo. When the flight engineer returned to the cockpit, he immediately donned his oxygen mask, then reported a piece of cargo just underneath the cockpit, that leaked vapour or fumes. The flight engineer felt dizzy and said, he was about to pass out. At this point the captain noticed, that the first officer acted strangely and showed signs of hypoxia. The first officer donned his oxygen mask, the captain used his oxygen mask only occasionally as he did not feel any symptom other than the odour. Without declaring emergency the captain decided to divert to the closest available airport at Budapest and requested a technical landing reporting the odour at 21:16LT (19:16Z). He decided to land as quickly as possible and opted to not dump fuel, but perform an overweight landing. The aircraft landed safely 25 minutes later.
The Hungarian Transportation Safety Board reported in their
English report released via the Icelandic "Rannsóknarnefnd flugslysa" (RNF), that the material was a synthetic pharmaceutic raw material. That material was solid below 5 degrees Centigrade, at higher temperatures the material becomes fluid and then intensively evaporates. During loading in Linate, which took several hours, the outside temperature had been around 30 degrees Centigrade, the temperature in the cargo bay had become even higher. Due to lack of cooling in the cargo bay the material evaporated during the flight and leaked through the non-airtight plastic barrels. The vapor caused nausea, the use of the oxygen masks prevented a deterioration of the situation.
The Hungarian TSB concluded:
3.1 Direct causes of the occurrence
- The company that prepared the hazardous material BAL5287 for shipping (Antibioticos S.P.A.) did not indicate on the shipping documentation and on the storage containers the required temperature while in storage and during shipping, and did not provide airtight containers.
- The cargo loader – while being aware of the fact that they were handling dangerous goods – did not check the MSDS upon receipt (they did not open the envelope containing the document) therefore the required storage temperature of +5 C° was neither ensured nor noted on the NOTOC.
- The required temperature of +2…+8 C° in the aircraft's cargo bay was not provided for the 149 kgs of vaccination that was listed in the NOTOC and was transported in JL position.
- The required cooling in the aircraft’s cargo bay was not provided for the 90 kgs of chocolate that was listed in the NOTOC and was transported in QL position.
- Due to lack of cooling, the crystallization of the material that could have prevented evaporation of dangerous vapours could not take place.
- The cargo load inspector did not sign the NOTOC and the captain accepted it without the signature.
3.2 Indirect causes of the occurrence
- The captain was aware of the procedures of the emergency manual for Category Nine dangerous goods but he did not consider the use of oxygen mask mandatory for himself.
3.3 Risk factors that cannot be linked to the occurrence
- There were several packages where the UN sign, the UN number, the PSN number, or the sender's data were covered or otherwise not clearly visible.
- The ULD identification tags contained the three-letter cargo IMP code, in contradiction with the IATA DGR which requires the usage of Class/Division Numbers.
- There were simultaneously Air Malaysia and Air France package ID labels on the packages which is not allowed.
- The form for listing the non-radioactive dangerous goods was a 2006 edition, and the answers given to questions No. 37 and No. 51 were incorrect.
- The medical check in the captain's pilot licence expired on 2 June 2007.
DOES ANYBODY KNOW SOMETHING MORE???