There has been much discussion about the technical faults which contributed to this crash. Alf5071h brings in some behavioural aspects. I will be fascinated to hear the CVR. There should lie the answers to so many questions. In the very beginning there were thoughts of complacancy; not monitoring etc. This could imply a state of low alertness. This is where I am confused.
It was training flight. The F/O was on a conversion trip and was not inexperienced. The T.C should have been alert and aware.
They were a little too close in and high on energy; so it is said here.
It was not CAVOK and they were using the automatics to operate the approach. Thus not a relaxed visual base leg.
All these factors should lead to a state of high alertness. I assume the T.C knew how to use the automatics to recover the situation. I assume the F/O knew how to manually fly and recover the situation; and perhaps from his B737 classic experience also knew how to use the AFDS. It's not that different in this situation, and the map gives even more situational awareness. I assume both pilots knew how & when to make a G.A.
The question for me remains how come they behaved as if in a low state of alertness when the opposite should have been the case? The CVR should help with the answers. I hope this was not an 'in-shalah' moment. Nor a Chinese Airbus "what is it doing now?" moment.
I'm sure the final report will tell us all. Meanwhile so much speculation seems wasted energy. Is it not time to wait and see.