Rainboe;
The point you raise is an appropriate one to consider. My needle is not stuck on narrow issues. I just think the discussion is valid on the basis f the observations made and apply broadly and not just to aviation, or to any one company. I discuss it here only because it has implications and consequences for the presently-low fatal accident rate. We have heard for some time now at conferences, in papers and on websites that, (notwithstanding the effects of the present economic situation), just maintaining the accident rate won't good enough to keep the line flat. It will climb purely as a matter of percentages alone. That matter is not addressed in the thinking and awarenesses described in the post above.
While the AMS accident may be a "once-off" or perhaps a trend within either a culture, part of the world or an airline, two other accidents outside those areas captured by your observation remain: The Madrid accident and the Buffalo accident. The Madrid one is of a slightly different quality in terms of the errors made I know, and we do not yet have definitive data on the Colgan accident. Crew experience and airline safety culture/SOPs/training regimes may or may not have played a role in both/either.