Rainboe;
the Egypt Sharm 737
And Egyptair 990...
Your remarks are appropriately blunt and spot on the mark.
I am firmly in the camp of using a systems approach to flight safety where organizational factors are often ignored as first causes because these days that is an appropriate area of investigation given that human factors is by far the #1 cause of accidents. But at some point it has to be acknowledged that there is no other reasonable explanation for this accident than the captain, and the crew, did not do their job, and instead stalled their aircraft resulting in the deaths of passengers. There is simply no excuse available to an experienced professional crew for ignoring a 40kt reduction in airspeed for over a minute and fourty seconds on final. And I agree too, that Boeing has soft-pedaled this far too much. Why many are still dancing instead of looking at this for what it is, is disturbing for the very reason they give for dancing - "
perhaps there is something deeper to learn here?" There is, and the sooner it is acknowledged the better: Why did the captain, and the two other pilots stall their aircraft?, and I am not pointing back to anything other than SA - what permitted the loss/absence of SA? Certainly not a radio altimeter fault, nor the warnings which resulted from same. The only possibility is a non-sterile cockpit environment, (which is also the subject of interest in the Colgan accident). The loss of SA is precisely where the lesson can be learned, if there are any lessons here at all. Again Rainboe - well focussed, well stated.