The news article makes for some interesting reading.
The FAA and JAA accepted Sikorsky's design after they installed an internal isolation valve that isolates all external MGB lubrication components.
If one assumes the oil filter bowl remains uncompromised....the design more than meets the requirement. Who would have thought the oil filter bowl would be a problem?
However, upon the Australian incident....that situation should have had a second review but it sounds as though "local maintenance practices" were held to blame for that incident which would have muted any second thoughts about the studs themselves it would appear.
Now we have the Cougar crash and it opens up a whole different set of issues.
Primarily, how did the 92 come to be thought to have a genuine 30 Minute run dry capability.
Then in particular, how did this affect the decision making process Cougar OPS and the lost crew used in making the fatal decison to continue flying at a normal power setting at 800 feet while tracking towards the nearest point of land?
Since we are second guessing systems and certification approvals.....what happens if the Standby Cooling System on the EC-225 decides to fail at the same time the gear box loses all of its lubrication contents? Does it have a true 30 Minute Run Dry capability?
After all.....it could happen right?