Meanwhile some of the more vociferous pilots here have been hanging the crew for various reasons but mostly for possibly violating the pilot code of 'be smarter than the machine or it will replace you'. On the other side some software types are pointing to this incident and saying 'see we need to make the software smarter to keep the pilots from making mistakes'.
To be fair to the non-pilot types (not only software engineers, there are some system engineers) I think that what makes them, and certainly me, pretty cross is that a non-essential bit of kit (the RA), in fulfilling a non-essential function (retard in the flare) is allowed to announce its failure by two irrelevant, and confusing side-effects: first by telling the crew that the gear is still up, which they understandably ignored, being at 2,000ft, and secondly, and TWICE, retarding the power levers to Flight idle in the middle of an approach.
Any machine that will do that reduces me to a jelly. The system designer who allowed a side effect like that should be ashamed of himself.
And yes, of course the crew should have noticed what was going on, but I think we all know that something else was happening on that flight deck. If the CVR doesn't reveal it, perhaps the autopsies will.