Semaphore Sam - yes I would judge your comment to be pre-mature, premature too.
Tee Emm - Point taken. I meant of course the likelihood that if they were a little fast then the PL's were probably already at idle when RA#1 malfunctioned to command RETARD and that the crew fully expected the A/T would restore thrust at the appropriate time but failed to monitor. The idea of installing some form of stabilised approach criteria monitor alarm or warning would be to pick that up and alert the crew. I know in my case the guilt of knowing I am often a little faster than stabilized criteria might allow, has me keep a good grip on the PL's while eyeballing the airspeed intently, willing it to decrease so that I can restore thrust to its proper value. But then I don't have the luxury of A/T to do that for me which tends to concentrate the mind.
Wizofoz - I too am leary of adding yet more automation and I agree with all your points about SOP's and training and the culture of flying with automatics. But the plain fact is that adherence to stabilized approach criteria would have saved the day in this instance, but they are not being enforced precisely because application is left to the pilots discretion. Perhaps the flying public deserve a better standard of compliance with stabilized approach criteria than we have been able to effect to date and if such a warning system were devised I tend to believe that pilots would fear its intrusion rather than rely on it in the same way that controllers are wary of the snitch patch. It's gonna mess up the arrival rates at the busier airports but them's the breaks.
Last edited by MU3001A; 11th Mar 2009 at 05:02.