Rainboe's comment was just a demonstration of his pure frustration.
If you erroneously blame the radalt, then you should also erroneously blame:
- The autopilot, for not being programmed to drop out when below a safe speed.
- The autothrust, for not having an always-on alpha prot / alpha floor functions, and "Speed speed" callouts.
- The displays, for not flashing a radalt discrepancy.
- The dome light, for not flashing when peril is detected.
I have many thousands of hours in both seats of the NG (as well as the 320 series). I find the NG to be crude, nasty to fly, ergonomically challenged and generally a bit incapable during significant non-normals. But it has a saving grace - simultaneously squeeze both thumbs and you are back in a simple aircraft. On numerous occasions when things are going wrong or I think they may go wrong, I have done this and normality has been restored.
What caused the Turkish crew to not do this? I believe that this accident may resemble the Eastern 401 accident in many ways, but not until we hear what is being said on the approach, and in what style, will this become clear. If,
for example, one dominant crew member was shouting, then this could have distracted the other two from their flying or monitoring.
What will stop everyone else from doing this in the future? Make sure PF is actually F, and
strictly observe stable approach criteria. Our lot make it mandatory to be fully configured at 1000' (in all conditions) and you should be stable. So if the thrust is not up, you are ready to go around. At 500' you must be stable (in all conditions), so if the thrust is not correct or the speed is not correct, then you must go around. Even if the PF was not fully on the case in the Turkish aircraft, then he would still (I hope) have seen that at 1000' the levers were at idle, and would have been watching them like a hawk to check they were up by 500'.