Hello all,
Like many people said, I think pilots should aviate first and know their airplane inside out. But I also think it's good to eliminate potential problems.
I have some questions not directly related to this accident..
Some pilots in this thread reported that altitude call-outs were not available when RA#1 indicated -7 ft during their flights.
- Does that mean some or all GPWS modes are inhibited during this type of fault?
- What about TCAS RAs (resolution advisory) being so close to the ground? Does TCAS compare RA inputs? Are they inhibited?
- Fictional scenario on any a/c:
Fail-operational Autoland below actual or wrongly sensed alert height with disagreeing RAs, overreading or underreading?
Alert height is AGL height, sensed by RA. RA failure affecting alert height logic does not sound impossible, but I guess it depends how well the the avionics software handles RA errors and number of RAs.
- Any other potential problem not included in Boeing memo?