Less 'heat' on Boeing, I feel - they HAD to issue the 'reminder' of how to fly once they were 'warned' by the Dutch investigation, I'm sure. They were really on a hiding to nothing there.
While I was flying the 737 at LGW with BA they ran a situation awareness course in the early 2000s to address the subtle incapacitation of active monitoring caused by increasingly sophisticated automation and instrumentation. It seems this needs to be repeated - everywhere.
Part of the 'problem' is that we are (correctly) encouraged to engage the A/P when things go wrong to allow the system to do the basic flying while we resolve the issue. This, I'm now convinced, is leading pilots into a state of nirvana where the automatics are everything and we can all relax. To some extent, the LHR BA 777 may reflect that, with the A/P being left in to follow the glide while the speed decayed towards the stall, just like AMS, and the PGF Airbus crash shows the same over-trust in the systems.
The question is, how do we address this?